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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
This is a consolidated appeal from the decision by Intervenor-Respondent, State of 
Idaho, ex rei., Industrial Commission (Commission), denying a portion of the attorney fees 
claimed by Real Party in Interest-Appellant, Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (Seiniger), in the lump 
sum settlements of three workers' compensation cases. 
Seiniger claims entitlement to 25% of the funds awarded to its clients for Permanent 
Partial Impairment (PPI) benefits, as contemplated by the fee agreements with its clients, the 
Defendants-Respondents. Seiniger asks that these fees be awarded without regard to the 
Commission's regulation permitting attorney fees to be taken only from those funds which were 
disputed and which were recovered primarily or substantially due to the efforts of the attorney. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Course of Proceedings set out by Seiniger in Appellant's Opening Brief (App. Br., 
pp. 1-2) is generally accurate. The Commission has set out below the amount of additional 




$624.1i (R. Vol. 3,p. 558) 
$1,942.19 (R. Vol. 2, p. 242) 
$5,098.53 CR. Vol. 3, p. 508) 
I The Commission's Final Order on Attorney Fees (R. Vol. 4, pp. 652-656) correctly states that the entire 
$933.28 attorney fee sought by Seiniger on the PPI benefit in the Gomez case was disapproved. 
However, since Seiniger's calculation of the attorney fee due from the lump sum consideration was 
$309.11 short, in its Order Approving in Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge (R. 
Vol. 3, p. 558) the Commission deducted that shortage from the disapproved PPI fee; leaving $624.17 as 
the net balance to be held in trust pending the decision on this appeal ($933.28 - $309.11 = $624.17). 
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C. Statement of Facts 
Seiniger does not dispute the key findings of fact made by the Commission in these three 
consolidated cases and has stipulated that Seiniger's efforts did not meet the evidentiary 
standards set out in the Commission's current regulation. Seiniger's efforts were neither 
primarily or substantially responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid. 
(Appellant's Opening Brief~ pp. 6-7 & n.2). While these findings (Kulm: R. Vol. 2, pp. 204-252; 
R. Vol. 3, pp. 428-433; Stienmetz: R. Vol. 3, pp. 500-508; Gomez: R. Vol. 4, pp. 595-604) are 
not in dispute, the Commission feels it useful to provide the Court with a short summary of the 
facts in these three cases. 
(a). Kulm 
Defendant-Respondent, Laurel Kulm (Kulm), injured her low back and lower extremities 
on November 2, 2006. On or about April 26, 2007, Dr. Greewald reviewed an April 5, 2007 
MRI, and proposed that in order to understand whether Kulm's disc herniation was causally 
related to the accident, further review of pre-injury chiropractic and other records was indicated. 
On May 30, 2007, Kulm retained Seiniger and executed a contingent fee agreement. (R. Vol. ], 
pp. 7-] 0). Among her reasons for retaining Seiniger was her concern she was getting the 
runaround from the surety. Shortly after he was retained, Seiniger arranged for Kulm to undergo 
a medical evaluation by Dr. Richard Radnovich, D.O. Dr. Radnovich saw Claimant on June 7, 
2007, and proposed that Kulm was entitled to a 12% permanent partial impairment (PPI) rating, 
even though he noted that she was still treating.2 Also, on June 6, 2007, Dr. Greenwald 
concluded that Kulm's low back problems were indeed, related to the subject accident, following 
2 A permanent partial impairment rating is not warranted until a claimant is medically stable. (Idaho 
Code §72-422). 
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her review of pre-injury chiropractic records. Although Dr. Radnovich had pronounced Kulm 
medically stable, Kulm continued to treat, and the surety continued to pay for treatment, 
including, inter alia, a transforaminal epidural steroid injection. The surety did not accept Dr. 
Radnovich's impairment rating and declined to pay the same. However, on November 7, 2007, 
Beth Rogers, M.D., one of Kulm's treating physicians, pronounced Kulm medically stable and 
awarded her a 5% PPI rating. The surety promptly initiated payment of this rating, but did not 
agree to pay the average of the 5% and the] 2% ratings per the usual convention in such cases. 
Seiniger took a 25% fee on the PPI benefits.3 
On June 26, 2009, Kulm and her employer and surety filed a lump sum settlement 
agreement with the Commission. CR. Vol. 1, pp. ]2-21). The settlement provided $13,000 in 
additional monies for Kulm; of which, 25% would be paid to Seiniger. Commission staff 
reviewed the settlement and on September 3, 2009, the Manager of the Claims and Benefits 
Department sent a letter advising Seiniger that an initial determination was made finding the 
settlement in the best interests of the parties, except for the attorney's fees on benefits paid prior 
to the execution of the settlement. CR. Vol. 1, p. 33). Thereafter, Seiniger requested a hearing. 
Seiniger appeared at the hearing and contended that he was entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees consistent with the terms of the contingent fee agreement executed by Kulm. CR. 
Vol. 2, pp. ] 74-203.) The Commission found that Seiniger's actions, in gaining a PPI rating 
from Dr. Radnovich prior to Kulm's medical stability, did not primarily or substantially secure 
the award of PPI benefits for Kulm. Therefore, Seiniger was not entitled to take a fee on the PPI 
benefits. R. Vol. 2, pp. 204-252; R. Vol. 3, pp. 428-433. 
3 Appellant also took attorney fees on disability benefits received by Kuhn prior to the settlement, but that 
fee was approved after the hearing and will not be highlighted in this condensed recitation of the facts. 
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(b). Stienmetz 
Defendant-Respondent, Tim Stienrnetz CStienrnetz), injured his back on January 7, 2008, 
when he lifted a hose used to pour concrete. On March 4, 2008, Stienrnetz had a L5-S 1 
microdiskectomy and a redo surgery on March 31, 2008, both performed by Dr. Montalbano. 
On April 10, 2008, Stienmetz retained the services of Seiniger. CR. Vol. 3, pp. 442-445). 
Seiniger contends that on June 3, 2008, he made a written demand upon Dr. Montalbano for a 
PPI rating. Instead of issuing a rating, Dr. Montalbano recommended Stienrnetz participate in a 
work hardening program. Stienmetz completed the LifeFit work hardening program, where the 
program director, Dr. Friedman, opined Stienmetz incurred a ] 2% PPI rating. Seiniger took 
attorney fees of $5,098.53 against the PPI award of $20,394.00. 
On December 23, 2009, Stienmetz and his employer and surety filed a lump sum 
settlement agreement with the Commission. CR. Vol. 3, pp. 446-453). The settlement agreed to 
resolve all remaining issues for the additional sum of $28,900.00 as consideration. Commission 
staff reviewed the settlement and on January 13, 2010, the Manager of the Claims and Benefits 
Department sent a letter advising Seiniger that an initial determination was made finding the 
settlement to be in the best interests of the parties, except for the prior attorney fees on the PPI 
benefits paid. CR. Vol. 3, pp. 456-457). Thereafter, Seiniger requested a hearing. 
Seiniger appeared at the hearing and conceded that while he could not prove that he was 
primarily or substantially responsible for obtaining the PPI benefits, his fee was reasonable, 
based on the IDAPA and controlling case law. CR. Vol. 3, pp. 467-468.) The Commission found 
that Seiniger's actions, in requesting a PPI rating from Dr. Montalbano which did not result in 
him giving a rating, did not primarily or substantially secure the award of PPI benefits for 
Steinmetz. Therefore, Seiniger was not entitled to take a fee on the PPI benefits. CR. Vol. 3, pp. 
500-508.) 
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(c). Gomez 
Defendant-Respondent, Maria Gomez (Gomez), injured her right knee on February 3, 
2005. On October 5, 2005, Gomez retained the services of Seiniger. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 517-520). 
The insurance adjuster assigned to the claim asked Dr. Nicola to provide an impairment rating 
for Gomez. Dr. Nicola opined Gomez was entitled to a 5% PPI rating with 2.5% apportioned to 
Gomez's preexisting condition. The surety paid 2.5% PPI benefits to Gomez and Seiniger took 
attorney fees of$933.28 against the PPI award of$3,733.13. 
On October 2, 2009, Gomez and her employer and surety filed a lump sum settlement 
agreement with the Commission. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 542-554). The settlement agreed to resolve all 
remaining issues for the additional sum of $13,442.57 as consideration. Commission staff 
reviewed the settlement and on December 24, 2009, the Manager of the Claims and Benefits 
Department sent a letter advising Seiniger that an initial determination was made finding the 
settlement in the best interests of the parties, except for the prior attorney fees on the PPI benefits 
paid. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 555-556). Thereafter, Seiniger requested a hearing. 
Seiniger appeared at the hearing and conceded that while he could not prove that he was 
primarily or substantially responsible for obtaining the PPI benefits, his fee was reasonable, 
considering the previously executed fee agreement and his many valuable contributions to 
Gomez's case. CR. Vol. 4, pp. 569-594.) The Commission found that it was the surety's adjuster 
who requested the PPI rating and that Seiniger's actions did not primarily or substantially secure 
the award of PPI benefits for Gomez. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 595-603). Therefore, Seiniger was not 
entitled to take a fee on the PPI benefits. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 595-604.) 
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II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues to be decided by this Court are: 
1. Is the Industrial Commission's regulation governing the approval of attorney 
fees in workers' compensation cases constitutional? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission correctly apply its attorney fee regulation to the 
three cases on appeal? 
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III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court's review of Industrial Commission decisions is limited to a determination of 
whether the Commission's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 687, 963; P.2d 368,370 (1998). Substantial and competent 
evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence 
that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. 
This Court exercises free review over the Commission's conclusions oflaw. Id. 
INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF PAGE 7 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The history of attornev fee awards by the Industrial Commission. 
The Commission believes it may be useful to the Court to review the history of the efforts 
made by the Commission and the decisions rendered by this Court to ensure that the 
Commission's implementation and exercise of its statutory authority to approve attorney fees in 
workers' compensation cases is constitutional. 
Before 1988 the Commission did not have any written guidance, rule or regulation 
governing the approval of attorney fees under either Idaho Code §72-803; which is the subject of 
this appeal, or under Idaho Code § 72-804; that is not being questioned in this case. 
Though Idaho Code § 72-804 is not at issue in this case, it is important to distinguish the 
award of attorney fees under that section from those made under Idaho Code § 72-803. Idaho 
Code § 72-804 requires the Commission to award what the caption calls "punitive costs,,4 to a 
claimant when "without reasonable ground" an employer or his surety has contested a claim or 
stopped or failed to make payments due to a claimant. In those cases this "punitive" award of 
"reasonable attorney fees" is "in addition to the compensation provided by this law." (Idaho 
Code § 72-804, emphasis added.) In other words, this "reasonable" attorney fee is added to the 
award of compensation that the employer or his surety must pay the claimant; not deducted from 
4 Though the caption of Idaho Code § 72-804 appears to refer to this type of award of attorney fees as 
"punitive costs" since there are no other costs referred to in the statute other than attorney fees, and while 
the Legislature likely intended that this award would act as punishment for these bad faith acts by an 
employer or surety, this court, in Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 261, 263-264, 629 P.2d 657, 659-660 (1981); 
citing an earlier case, Mayo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161,457 P.2d 400 (1969), adopted an 
analysis; one which has been followed ever since, that found the award of attorney fees under this section 
to be "compensatory" in nature, since its award resulted in payment of the full compensation due to 
claimant without reduction for a contingent attorney fee. 
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it, as it would be in a normal contingent fee workers' compensation case. If the Commission 
finds that this type of misconduct has occurred, it must award the "reasonable attorney fees" 
called for by this statute to the claimant's attorney. 
In Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 261, 265, 629 P.2d 657, 661 (1981), the Commission had 
exercised its discretion under the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-804 and decided that the 
reasonable "punitive" attorney fee which should be awarded to the attorney was $2,500. That 
award was based upon the Commission's analysis of the time and effort put into the case by the 
attorney. About $11,000 would be due if the Commission had just applied the contingency fee 
agreement between the claimant and his attorney. The attorney claimed that he should be 
entitled to the amount due under the fee agreement. The Court reversed the Commission's 
award. 
It was not clear from the record whether the $2,500 attorney fee award had been made on 
a fixed fee or contingent fee basis. The claimant and his attorney had a contingent fee agreement 
which the Commission had approved years before and then, when making the award, 
disapproved. This disapproval was apparently due to the Bar Association's Advisory Fee 
Schedule, on which the fee agreement had been based, being cancelled by the Bar Association. 
This caused the Court to remand the case to the Commission in order to provide a more clear 
statement of the basis for its decision; notwithstanding the fact that the Commission had 
articulated two relevant factors it considered when determining the reasonableness of the fee. 
In its remand, the Clark Court provided guidance to the Commission on certain 
reasonableness factors relevant when considering the award of a "punitive" attorney fee under 
the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-804. It was not clear to the Court whether the Commission 
had made its decision on the reasonableness of the fee on a fixed or contingent fee basis. Id., at 
265. After a lengthy discussion of contingent fees, the Court provided nine factors other courts 
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had previously found to be relevant for consideration in determining a reasonable attorney fee on 
a contingency basis. Jd., at 265. However, the Court also said that the Industrial Commission 
must "engage in a balancing process" and that these nine factors were "[b]y no means 
exhaustive." Jd., at 265. 
It is important to keep in mind the context of the Clark decision. These nme 
"reasonableness" factors in the Clark decision have been the source of some controversy in the 
Commission's attempts to craft and apply regulations for awarding attorney fees under that 
separate, but similar, statute, Idaho Code § 72-803; which regulation is being challenged by 
Seiniger in this case. 
A few years later, this Court again dealt with the "reasonableness" of a "punitive" 
attorney fee award under Idaho Code § 72-804. In Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 
13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984), the Commission was still relying on affidavits provided by claimants' 
attorneys on the type and time of legal service provided, along with a copy of their fee 
agreement, in order to determine the reasonableness of the "punitive" attorney fee it must award 
in these cases. The attorney's affidavit in Hogaboom showed he had spent 46.75 hours 
($3,272.50 at $70/hour) on a case which had recovered only $540 in temporary total disability 
benefits and $950 in medical costs on behalf of his client. Jd., at 14. The unique contingent fee 
agreement in that case provided that the attorney would take 33 113 percent of any award unless 
the Commission awarded a larger amount. 
The Commission, following the rationale of the Clark Court, determined that it should 
use the contingency fee agreement as the basis for an award; rather than a fixed fee based on the 
time and effort involved. The Hogaboom Court agreed that, in addition to the nine factors 
outlined in Clark, the fee agreement should be considered, but said it should only be used as a 
guide: 
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However, it is likewise clear that such an agreement, though persuasive evidence, 
is not itself dispositive, but must be considered in conjunction with the factors 
cited in Clark, supra, 102 Idaho at 265-66, 629 P.2d 657, in order to determine 
whether the fee provided above is reasonable under all the circumstances. 
Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 16 (emphasis added). 
The Hogaboom Court then discussed at length the legislative purpose of the Workers' 
Compensation Law found in Idaho Code § 72-201, to provide "sure and certain relief for injured 
workmen and their families." The Court also discussed the legislative intent behind the 
provision for a "punitive" award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804. The Court found it 
was to encourage claimants to seek legal counsel and to motivate attorneys to accept clients in 
those cases wherein the employer or surety has acted unreasonably, but where the amount in 
controversy was so small as to not otherwise merit the risk for both claimant and attorney alike. 
It was designed to compensate both the attorney and claimant for undertaking a battle with the 
offending party at the Commission in those small, but egregious unreasonable denial of benefit 
cases. Id., at 16-17. 
Since the fee agreement in Hogaboom showed a clear intent by the parties to permit an 
award by the Commission of an amount larger than 33 1/3 percent, the COUli remanded the case 
to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of the fee, using not only the Clark factors 
and the fee agreement, but to now also consider the legislative intent of the Workers' 
Compensation Law itself and of this "punitive cost" attorney fee statute in particular. "[T]he 
Commission must arrive at a reasonable award considering not only the Clark factors cited 
supra, but the legislative intent behind the Workmen's Compensation laws and I.C. § 72-804 as 
construed by this Court today." Hogaboom, at 18 (emphasis added). 
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There is another early case which should be considered in this journey through the history 
and evolution of attorney fee approvals by the Commission Brannon v. Pike, 112 Idaho 938, 
737 P.2d 459 (1987). After reviewing all of the various provisions of the Workers' 
Compensation Law that granted the Commission authority over attorney fees, including the one 
relevant in this case, Idaho Code § 72-803, the Court decided that the Industrial Commission; not 
the District Court, had jurisdiction over a complaint between a workers' compensation claimant 
and his attorney over their fee agreement. The Court made this important finding with respect to 
the Commission's authority for the award of attorney fees in general: 
In view of the uniquely broad grant of original and exclusive jurisdiction 
over workers' compensation matters given to the Industrial Commission, and the 
fact that I.C. § 72-803 confers upon the commission the jurisdiction to resolve 
claims for attorney fees, we conclude that there exists a legislative intent that 
jurisdiction over claims by a client against his attorney arising out of their fee 
agreement in a workers' compensation case is properly with the Industrial 
Commission, and not the district court. 
Brannon, 112 Idaho at 940 (emphasis added). 
Such was the legal status of the Commission's authority over the approval of attorney 
fees; both under Idaho Code § 72-804 and 72-803, as it had been analyzed by this Court's 
decisions, when, in 1988, the Commission enacted its first attorney fee regulation. 
On July 15, 1988, the Commission promulgated a regulation, IDAPA 17.01.01.528, 
which required attorneys to provide information by filling out forms detailing the legal fees and 
costs incurred in all cases litigated before the Commission (see a poor, but the only available 
copy [minus one form] in the Appendix; Document #1). This rule was primarily designed to 
fulfill the Commission's responsibility under Idaho Code § 72-528, to gather statistical data on 
these legal costs, but it did provide the Commission with helpful information on the current 
market price and costs incurred for legal services in workers' compensation cases. 
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The following year the Commission adopted what was called an 
"Informal Administrative Rule (IAR) 72-5085" (see a copy in the Appendix; Document #2). 
Idaho Code § 72-508 grants the Commission power to adopt reasonable rules and regulations. 
At that time, the Commission apparently believed that since the approval of legal fees was a 
concomitant part of resolving litigated or settled cases, the exemption from the requirement to 
promulgate a formal rule under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAP A Idaho Code § 
67-5201, et seq.) for Commission judicial matters that is found in Idaho Code § 72-508, would 
permit the issuing of this type of informal rule for the award of attorney fees under the authority 
ofIdaho Code § 72-803. 
It is interesting to note that this first written "rule" for approving attorney fees, issued 
December 21, 1989, required attorneys to disclose in their stipulations for lump sum settlements 
"the date upon which counsel became involved in the case" and "the issues then, and 
subsequently, in controversy" (Appendix, Document #2). 
Two weeks later, on January 9, 1990, the Commission issued a revised version of this 
informal rule for approval of attorney fees in lump sum settlements. This new rule, IAR 72-
803.1 (see Appendix, Document #3), gave attorneys the option of submitting their statement of 
fees in a separate letter or memo when the lump sum settlement stipulation was submitted. It 
also required claimant's attorneys to make their fee and cost information readily available to the 
party preparing the stipulation if that was how the statement of fees was going to be submitted. 
5 This rule was referred to as "IAR 72-803, dated December 21, 1989" when being rescinded by its 
successor, IAR 72-803.L on January 9, 1990 (Appendix, Document #3). The designation of this and 
successor informal rules with: "72-803," shows a clear intent to apply these rules only to attorney fee 
awards made under the authority of Idaho Code § 72-803; not the "reasonable attorney fees" awarded as 
"punitive costs" under Idaho Code § 72-804; which to this day are awarded without written regulations 
using only the guidance provided by Clark and Hogaboom. 
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On the same day, January 9, 1990, the Commission issued another informal "rule" - IAR 
72-803.2 (see Appendix, Document #4). It is in this last informal rule, which the Commission 
called a "Letter of understanding" (Appendix, Document #4, second paragraph), that the seeds of 
the Commission's current regulation were planted. 
That rule put in writing for the first time the policy which the Commission had already 
been following - that attorney fees would only be awarded against those contested benefits 
which the attorney had obtained for the claimant. 
As in the past, the Commission will not approve fees based upon benefits 
already paid by the employer or surety, or upon uncontested benefit amounts to be 
paid by employer or surety prior to the selection of an attorney. Fees will be 
assessed against "new money" only, i.e., benefits which counsel directly 
succeeded in obtaining on client's behalf. 
IAR 72-803.2 (Appendix, Document #4, fourth paragraph.) 
As of January 9, 1990, the Commission had given written notice to attorneys handling 
workers' compensation cases that attorney's fees could only be assessed against those benefits 
which had not been paid to their client and which were being contested by the employer or surety 
prior to their retention as attorney, i.e., only against that "new money" which the attorney had 
"directly" succeeded in recovering for the claimant. Unfortunately, that notice did not comply 
with the requirements for promulgating administrative rules under IDAP A. 
In 1991 four attorneys; including Seiniger, filed appeals to this Court from Commission 
decisions disapproving their requests for attorney's fees because they did not comply with the 
requirements ofIAR 72-803.2. In CUff v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), the Court 
made it clear that the Industrial Commission may not, sua sponte, modify attorney fee 
agreements without advance notice and an opportunity for a meaningful hearing. The Court also 
held that any attorney's fee modification must be based on clear guidelines found in properly 
enacted regulations. Id., at 691. 
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The CUff Court clearly understood the difference between the Commission's authority to 
award a "punitive" attorney fee under Idaho Code § 72-804, based on the reasonableness factors 
of Clark and the legislative intent of that section required by Hogaboom, and the award of 
attorney fees in a case pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-803: 
Although Hogaboom and Clark provide helpful substantive guidance for the 
adoption of an implementation regulation under I.e. § 72-803, the two cases 
interpret the application of I.C. § 72-804 and are inapposite to a situation arising 
under I.C. § 72-803, where the Commission dons its quasi-legislative, rather than 
quasi-judicial cloak. Under the provisions of I.C. § 72-803, the Commission has 
broad discretion to approve fees, but must adopt regulations defining the criteria 
for approval or rejection. 
CUff, 124 Idaho at 693. 
However, even before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Curr, the Commission, 
perhaps sensing the Court's concern about the need for a proper administrative rule, began the 
process to promulgate a new IDAPA regulation for the approval of attorney fees awarded under 
the provisions ofIdaho Code § 72-803. 
On October 21, 1992, after public hearings were held around the state and written 
comments received, the three Commissioners met in regular session and discussed adoption of a 
proposed new attorney fee regulation. The Minutes of that meeting (see Appendix, Document 
#5) reflect a rather lively discussion about the appropriateness of even issuing a regulation to 
govern attorney's fees at all and an interesting revelation that at least one Commissioner believed 
that the Informal Administrative Rule 803.2, under attack in the then-pending Curr appeal, had 
not been promulgated under IDAPA in order to "keep the Legislature from regulating attorney 
fees in workers' compensation matters." (Appendix, Document #5, paragraph 4, p. 2.) The 
Commissioners decided to give those expressing reservations about the draft an opportunity to 
present suggested changes at their next meeting. (Appendix, Document #5, paragraph 3, p. 3.) 
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Two days later, on October 23, 1992, the Commissioners met agam and spent 
considerable time reviewing and discussing two different revisions of the draft IDAPA attorney 
fee regulation (see Appendix, Document #6). Draft #1 was adopted and a notice of that fact was 
published and mailed to all attorneys practicing before the Commission (see Appendix, 
Document #7). 
Twenty-one days later, Seiniger and 49 other Idaho attorneys practicing workers' 
compensation law, along with labor organizations and interested citizens, petitioned this Court 
for an ex parte temporary stay of that first IDAPA regulation, IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D (see 
Appendix, Document #8), that was due to become effective on December 1, 1992. While this 
Court granted a temporary stay of the implementation of that regulation on November 25, 1992, 
after full briefing and argument, the petitioners' request for a Writ of Prohibition was eventually 
denied on December 3, 1993. Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 
(1993; rehearing denied February 3, 1994). 
The Rhodes Court found that the Commission had been properly granted authority by the 
Legislature to "regulate" and not merely "approve" attorney's fees (Rhodes, 125 Idaho at 142). 
The Rhodes Court also determined that such authority "does not conflict with the judicial 
penumbra" of the judicial department's role over the practice of law. !d., at 141. The Court 
further found that: 
The regulation under challenge, promulgated to foster ease, utility, and 
predictability in the application of I.C. § 72-803, in turn does not overstep the 
legislative bounds of I.C. § 72-803, read in pari materia. (Citation omitted.) ... 
The language of I.C. § 72-803 contemplates that the Commission will monitor the 
appropriateness of fees on behalf of claimants, and therefore the regulation 
provides a reasonable interpretation of the power vested by I.C. § 72-803. 
Rhodes, 125 Idaho at 141. 
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Petitioners in Rhodes, as does Seiniger in the instant proceeding, challenged the 
constitutionality of the Commission's new IDAPA regulation on several grounds. They argued 
claimants would be denied their right to "competent counsel to seek redress for their industrial 
inj uries in violation of the due process clause of the constitution." It was also said the regulation 
"interferes with attorneys' right to pursue their profession, in violation of the equal protection 
clause of the constitution." Id., at 142. 
After discussing the proper principles for construing and challenging the constitutionality 
of a regulation, the Rhodes Court found that the regulation "must be tested under the restrained 
standard of equal protection review, the familiar rational basis test" and that "[t]he regulation 
withstands scrutiny under this test." Rhodes, 125 Idaho at 142. With respect to the controversial 
"new money" provision of that regulation; the precursor to the current regulation being 
challenged once more by Seiniger, the Court found: 
There is a rational relationship between the legitimate purpose to foster 
sure and certain relief for injured workers and the attorney fee regulation. The 
limit imposed by the regulation furthers the purpose by making the cost of 
attorneys paid from new money less burdensome. 
Rhodes, 125 Idaho at 142. 
The Court used this same standard to analyze the due process challenges made to that 
regulation and said that it satisfied that due process analysis. In fact, the Court directly addressed 
the claims of the petitioners that this regulation, which limited attorney fees to "new money," 
would drive attorneys out of the workers' compensation field: 
Unless it can be shown that the regulatory scheme makes legal representation 
entirely unavailable, evidencing the illegitimacy of the scheme, the scheme does 
not violate the due process right of a lawyer's prospective client to obtain legal 
representation. United States Dep '{ of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 724, 110 
S.Ct. 1428, 1433, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990) (anecdotal evidence, in the form of 
conclusions by attorneys that a fee limitation will cause attorneys to leave a field 
of practice or will impact the quality of attorneys in an area of practice is blatantly 
insufficient to meet [the] burden of proof). Petitioners have not met this burden, 
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and therefore, the attorney fee regulation does not violate due process. 
Rhodes, 125 Idaho at 142-143 
It was the strong validation given by the Rhodes Court to this first attempt at an IDAPA 
attorney fee regulation which gave the Commission the basis to make amendments that clarified 
its long-standing "new money" policy and led to the language found in the current regulation. 
B. The Industrial Commission's current regulation is constitutional. 
Shortly after the Rhodes decision, the Commission determined that it needed to provide 
further clarification and guidance to attorneys on this long-standing, and now judicially-tested, 
policy limiting the award of contingent attorney fees to only "new money," i.e., "benefits which 
counsel directly succeeded in obtaining on (his) client's behalf;" which was first put into writing 
in 1990 by the adoption oflAR 72-803.2 (Appendix, Document #4, para. 4, p. 1). Accordingly, 
the Commission drafted and adopted a new regulation, IDAPA 17.02.08.033, that was approved 
by the Idaho Legislature and became effective on July 1, 1994. (See Appendix, Document #9.) 
This new IDAPA regulation, except for the addition of one subparagraph (IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.02.b.vii - dealing with the disclosure and disposition of unpaid medical bills in 
lump sum settlements) which became effective on March 29, 2010, has remained unchanged to 
this day. However, due to the Commission re-writing and moving its medical fee regulation to 
another Chapter, the entire Chapter in which the attorney fee regulation is found was re-
promulgated and approved by the Idaho Legislature in 2011. That is why the current regulation 
now shows an effective date of April 7, 2011, the date the Idaho Legislature adjourned sine die; 
notwithstanding the actual effective date (with the one noted exception) was July 1, 1994. (See 
Appendix, Document # 1 0). 
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Seiniger argues here, as he did before the Commission, that the regulation at issue in 
Rhodes differs so substantially from the current regulation, that the Rhodes Court's finding that 
the former regulation passed constitutional muster has little to no bearing on whether the current 
regulation is likewise constitutional. However, a review of the regulations reveals that they 
incorporate the same principles, albeit by way of different verbiage. 
The former IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D, paragraph 4, read as follows: 
Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. After the effective 
date of this regulation, any contingent fee agreement between counsel and a 
claimant in a workers' compensation case shall provide that the amount of 
attorney's fees will not exceed 25% of any new money received by the claimant, 
whether such new money is acquired pursuant to a lump sum settlement 
agreement, other agreement, mediation or an award of the commission. 
The term "new money," is defined at the former regulation, paragraph 3, as follows: 
"New money" as used herein shall refer to monetary benefits to the claimant that 
counsel is responsible for securing through legal services rendered in connection 
with the client's workers' compensation claim. 
IDAPA ] 7.01.01.803.D (Appendix, Document #9, p. 1.) 
This long-standing concept, that in a workers' compensation case an attorney should be 
limited to taking a fee on monies secured through his efforts, is carried through in the current 
regulation limiting an attorney to a fee taken on benefits he "primarily or substantially" secured 
on behalf of claimant. A side by side review of the former and current regulations clearly 
demonstrates an underlying purpose to limit attorneys to taking fees only on monies secured as 
the result of something the attorney did. 
In summary, the current regulation preserves the notion of a 25% cap on attorney fees 
that existed under the regulation considered by the Rhodes Court. However, instead of applying 
that cap to "new money," the current regulation allows attorneys to take a 25% fee on "available 
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funds." Available funds do not include (a) compensation paid to a claimant prior to the retention 
of counsel, or (b) compensation which is not disputed to be owed prior to the retention of 
counsel. However, the term "available funds" does encompass those non-disputed benefits, 
claimant's entitlement to which did not arise until after the retention of counsel. The "available 
funds" which are subject to the attorney's charging lien are further constrained by the provisions 
of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c (Appendix, Document #10, p. 2). The attorney must show, inter 
alia, that his services operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund from which the 
attorney seeks to be paid. 
The net effect of these new regulatory provisions is to continue to ensure that the attorney 
fees approved in workers' compensation cases can only be taken from funds which the attorney's 
efforts "directly succeeded in obtaining on (his) client's behalf." (IAR 72-803.2, 9 Jan 1990, 
Appendix, Document #4.) 
The elements of that new 1994 attorney fee regulation; continued in the current 
regulation, spelling out the Commission's long-standing policy for the approval of attorney fees 
under the authority ofldaho Code § 72-803, and the Commission's application of the elements of 
that regulation, has been reviewed by this Court three times since it was first adopted. In every 
case, this Court has looked favorably upon those regulatory provisions and has approved of the 
actions of the Commission carried out thereunder. 
In Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 687, 963 P.2d 368, 370 (1998), the Court noted that 
the Commission had adopted a set of criteria for the approval of attorney fees in workers' 
compensation cases pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Idaho Code § 72-508 and in 
accord with the Court's decision in Rhodes. The Court noted that the constitutionality of the 
regulation at issue in Rhodes had been specifically upheld by that Court. Thereafter, the 
Mancilla Court conducted a comprehensive examination of the regulation and agreed with the 
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Commission that the attorney had not shown that his efforts "primarily or substantially" secured 
the PPI award for this client. 
In a similar appeal brought a few years later, this Court again reviewed the salient 
provisions of this regulation. 
Idaho Code § 72-803 grants the Industrial Commission authority to 
approve all claims for attorney fees. The rule governing approval of attorney fees 
in workers' compensation cases defines "reasonable" attorney fees as fees which 
are "consistent with the fee agreement and are to be satisfied from available 
funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5." IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.01.e. "Available funds" is defined as "a sum of money to which a 
charging lien may attach. It shall not include any compensation paid or not 
disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney." IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.01.a. Section OLe provides that a charging lien may be asserted by 
an attorney who is able to demonstrate that, among other things, "[T]he services 
of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which 
the attorney seeks to be paid." 
Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 134 Idaho 350, 352, 2 P.3d 735, 737 (2000; rehearing 
denied 16 Jun 2000). 
After reviewing the Mancilla case, and applying the provisions of the then (and now) 
current regulation to the facts in this case, the Johnson Court concluded "that substantial and 
competent evidence supports the Commission's determination that (the attorney) was not 
primarily or substantially responsible for securing Johnson's PPI award." Johnson, 134 Idaho at 
353. 
It is important for the Court to note that the fee agreement in Johnson; like those fee 
agreements in this case which Seiniger argues should be controlling, entitled the attorney to 25% 
"of any amounts recovered by whatever means." Jd., at 351. However, the Johnson Court, as 
should this Court, did not consider such a "contract" to provide any countervailing authority to 
the Commission's statutory and regulatory authority over the approval of attorney fees in 
workers' compensation cases. 
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The last case to give this Court an opportunity to review the Commission's attorney fee 
regulation; albeit on an issue rather tangential to the one before the Court in this case, was 
Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 137 P.3d 417 (2006; rehearing denied June 29, 2006). 
In that case, the attorney challenged that provision of the attorney fee regulation requiring 
an attorney to provide a client with a fee disclosure statement upon being retained and mandating 
that: "No fee may be taken from a claimant on a contingency fee basis unless the claimant 
acknowledges receipt of the disclosure by signing it." (IDAPA 17.02.08.033.04, Appendix, 
Document #10, p. 4.) 
The attorney in that case had not provided his client with the required disclosure 
statement and the Court rejected the attorney's arguments; made on various grounds, including 
quantum meruit, that the Court should ignore the regulation and approve that attorney fee which 
his client expected to pay, as it was a reasonable and customary charge for those services in the 
legal community. 
The Cheung Court found, inter alia, that: 
The meaning of the rule is readily apparent, and the Industrial Commission's 
interpretation of the rule is reasonable. We accordingly affirm the Industrial 
Commission's determination that (the attorney's) failure to comply with the 
disclosure requirement of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.04 merited the forfeiture of his 
fees earned in the worker's compensation action. 
Cheung, 143 Idaho at 35. 
In all three of these cases, Mancilla, Johnson, and Cheung, this Court examined and 
upheld the Commission's application of provisions of the current regulation that is again being 
challenged by Seiniger in this case. There can be no doubt that that this Court has already found, 
albeit tacitly, that the provisions of this regulation pass constitutional scrutiny, as did the direct 
antecedent to the current regulation considered by the Rhodes Court. 
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C. The Commission correctly applied the regulation to the facts. 
In the decisions being appealed by Seiniger in this case, the Commission focused its 
analysis on what it means for an attorney to "primarily or substantially" secure the fund from 
which he seeks to be paid. The Commission determined that in order to give some meaning to 
this disjunctive phrase, "primarily" must be interpreted to mean "at first; originally; initially," 
and "substantially" must be interpreted to mean "essentially; without material qualification; in 
the main; in substance; materially; in a substantial manner." To illustrate its interpretation of the 
regulation and how it should be applied, the Commission discussed a number of hypothetical, but 
common, scenarios involving claims for attorney fees on non-disputed funds, entitlement to 
which did not arise until after the retention of counsel. The Commission also determined that in 
the three cases consolidated in this appeal, Seiniger had failed to establish that his efforts were 
"primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he sought to be paid. 
To Seiniger's argument that the involvement of an attorney always spurs the recalcitrant 
surety to toe the line and do things in a timely fashion, when it might not otherwise have been so 
inclined, the Commission ruled that this argument invited the kind of speculation that was found 
unpersuasive by both the Commission and the Court in Mancilla. 
Seiniger's Opening Brief states, in several places and different ways, that Seiniger is not 
attacking the Commission's authority, granted by Idaho Code § 72-803, to "approve" attorney's 
fees. However, Seiniger seems to be saying, again in several ways, that in order to be valid, such 
approval can only be based upon certain "reasonableness" factors, like those set out in Clark. 
Any attempt by the Commission to use objective criteria to measure that reasonableness; 
specifically those in the Commission's current regulation, is said to be "unconstitutional;" again, 
for the various reasons and upon the multiple grounds set forth in Seiniger's Opening Brief. 
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Without belaboring the Commission's interpretation of the regulation and its application 
to the facts, and since Seiniger does not take issue with the Commission's actions in this regard, 
the Commission would simply refer the Court to the decisions which exhaustively treat this 
Issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For more than two decades the Industrial Commission, guided by this Court's decisions 
in the cases cited above, has attempted to properly and fairly apply the authority granted by 
Idaho Code § 72-803 to approve attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases. The evolution 
of the Commission's regulation of attorney fees discussed above shows the legitimate efforts 
made by the Commission to consistently ensure that claimants are provided that "sure and certain 
relief' which is the object of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. 
The current regulation continues to be a constitutional exercise of the authority granted to 
the Commission by Idaho Code § 72-803. Its foundation was scrutinized and found 
constitutional by this Court in Rhodes and its key provisions have been examined and cited 
favorably by this Court in Mancilla, Johnson and Cheung. 
This case arises because the Commission is bound to administer the workers' 
compensation laws of this state. It is obligated to apply the statutory scheme as well as properly 
enacted regulations. The direct antecedent to the current regulation was legally enacted in ] 994, 
albeit to almost universal opposition. Many of the opposing voices raised the same arguments 
that Seiniger makes in this case. Notwithstanding these objections, the Rhodes Court recognized 
that the Commission acted within the grant of its authority when it enacted a regulation which 
placed limits on an attorney's ability to take a fee on workers' compensation benefits paid to an 
injured worker. 
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Quite apart from whether the current Industrial Commissioners agree with the policies 
that were thought to be advanced by the 1994 attorney fee regulation, this Commission is 
obligated to apply this valid regulation, the fundamental underpinnings of which have passed 
constitutional muster. As noted in this Commission's decision in Kuhn, practical difficulties 
frequently arise when trying to apply the regulation. It is a regulation that would benefit, 
perhaps, from studied revision. The Commission is particularly mindful, as was the Curr Court, 
of the fact that attorneys frequently provide a valuable service to an injured worker which does 
not result in the creation of a fund from which the attorney can otherwise be paid. 
Even so, the regulation is what it is, and the Commission is constrained to apply its 
unambiguous language. The Commission has acted based on its belief that this regulation is not 
only constitutional, but that it was correctly applied to the facts of the three cases at issue in this 
consolidated appeal. Nevertheless, the Commission would welcome any guidance or direction 
that this Court may give concerning the continuing implementation of its authority under Idaho 
Code § 72-803 or the Commission's interpretation and application of the current regulation to the 
facts in this appeal. 
DATED this 
--"1'''----
of February, 2012 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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04323. -- 05280. (RESERVED) 
05281. RULE GOVERNING REPORTING OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
01. Requirements for Reporting. The following information shall be reported 
to the Commission, on a form furnished by the Commission (see Appendix I) by all 
sureties, self-insurers, the State Insurance Fund, the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 
and non-insured employers, relative to each case litigated before the Industrial 
Commission within 30 days following the entry of a final award by the ' lndustrial 
Commission, or, in the event of an appeal to a higher court, not later than 30 days 
following a final ruling by the court. The information reported shall break down the 
litigation expenses incurred in each case by the reporting party into the following 
categories, and, if the case is appealed, shall include such costs incurred on 
appeal: (7-15-88) 
a. all fees paid to attorneys; (7-15-88) 
b. all expenses charged by attorneys; (7-15-88) 
c. charges for reports or testimony of witnesses; (7-15-88) 
d. cost of a.ny depositioftS taken; (7-15-88) 
e. cost for investigation made before or during hearing; (7-15-88) 
f. costs of research or legal briefs (if separate from attorney fees). 
(7-15-88) 
02. Information to be Reported. The following information shall be reported 
to me Commission, on a form furnished by the Commission (see Appendix II) by all 
attorneys engaged in representing any claimant in a litigated vvorkmen's compensation 
insurance claim before the Commission, relative to each case litigated, within 30 days 
following the entry of a final award by the Industrial Commission, or in the even of an 
appeal to a higher court, not later than 30 days following a final decision by the court. 
The information reported shall break down into the following categories the litigation 
expenses incurred in each case, and, if the case is appealed, shall include such 
expenses or costs incurred on appeal: (7-15-88) 
a. attorneys fees incurred in litigation and charged to claimam; 
(7-15-88) 
b. expenses incurred in litigation and charged to claimant. (7-15-88) 
03. Definition af litigated Case. For purposes of § 72-528, Idaho Code, and 
this rule, 2 "case litigated before the Industrial Commission" shall mean a case in 
which an applIcation for hearing has been filed. (7-15-88) 




I.C. CASE NO. 
I. C. CASE NAME 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
317 MAIN STREET 
BOISE, ID 83720 
REPORT OF LI~IGATION ~XPENSES 
(EMPLOYER/SURETY/ISIF/SELF INSURERS) 
-rr------- -
In accordance with the requirements of Section 72-528, Idaho 
Code, this form shall be filled out and returned to the 
Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry 
of a final award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, 
or, in the event of an appeal to a final court, within 30 days 
following a final ruling by the court. If there is an appeal, 
the totals specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or 
fees incurred in the appeal. 
1. Attorneys fees paid in case: 
2. Expenses charged by attorneys: 
3. Charges for reports or testimony 
of witnesses: 
4. Cost of any depositions taken: 
5. Cost of investigations made before 
or during hearing: 
6. Costs of research or legal briefs 
(if separate from attorneys fees): 
7. Filing fees paid on account of 
the litigation: 
$_-----
TOTAL $ ____________ _ 
Dated this day of "to ---------------------, .~ 
FIR..11 NAME -------------------------------------------------
BY ____________________________________________________ __ 
Check Applicable Box: 
Self-Insured uninsured Emplover Surety 
State Insurance Fund Industrial-Special I~dennity Fund 
DOCUMENT # 2 
IAR 72-508 
RE: REPORTING OF ATTORNEY FEES AND ASSOCIATED EXPENSES 
IN LUMP SUM PROCEEDINGS 
So that the Idaho Industrial Commission may properly 
discharge its responsibility to review and approve claims for 
attorneys' fees in worker's compensation cases pursuant to § 72-
803, IDAHO CODE, it is requested that all attorneys involved in 
lump sum settlement cases set forth in the lump sum stipulation: 
a. the date upon which counsel became involved 
in the case; 
b. the issues then, and subsequently, in 
controversy; 
c. the total attorney's fee charged client on 
this matter, whether relating to interim 
payment for ttd's, ppi, matters directly 
germane to the lump sum stipulation and 
settlement agreement, or other issues 
related to the matter before the 
Commission; and 
d. the total of litigation expenses incurred 
by counsel and charged to the client. 
It is noted that this request is in addition to, and not in 
lieu of, the filing of IC Form #1022 or IC Form #1023, as required 
by IDAPA 17.01.01.528. 
DATED this ~ I day of 
INDUSTRIAL 
ATTEST: 
DOCUMENT # 3 
IAR 72-803.1 
RE: REPORTING OF ATTORNEY FEES AND ASSOCIATED EXPENSES 
IN LUMP SUM PROCEEDINGS 
So that the Idaho Industrial Commission may properly 
discharge its responsibility to review and approve claims for 
attorneys' fees charged by claimants' counsel in workers' 
compensation cases pursuant to § 72-803, IDAHO CODE, it is 
requested that attorneys involved in lump sum settlement cases set 
forth in the lump sum. stipulation, or by letter or memo 
accompanying the lump sum stipulation: 
a. the date upon which claimant's counsel 
became involved in the casei 
b. the issues then, and subsequently, in 
controversy; 
c. the total claimant's attorney's fee, 
exclusive of passed through costs, charged 
client on this matter, whether relating to 
interim payment for ttd' s, ppi f matters 
directly germane to the lump sum 
stipulation and settlement agreement, or 
other issues related to the matter before 
the Commissioni and 
d. the total of costs incurred by claimant's 
counsel and passed through to client. 
Should the information requested above be included in the 
lump sum stipulation and agreement, it shall be incumbent upon 
claimant I s counsel to ensure that the necessary information is 
readily available to the party preparing the stipulation and 
agreement. 
It is noted that this request is in addition to, and not in 
lieu of, the filing of IC Form #1022 f as required by IDAPA 
17.01.01.528. 
IAR 72-803, dated December 21, 1989, is hereby rescinded. 




DOCUMENT # 4 
IAR 72-803.2 -' 
RE: ATTOR~EY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACTIONS 
The Idaho Industrial Commission finds that the issue of 
attorney fees is one that needs clarification. The Commission 
recognizes its responsibility to remove any doubt as to appropriate 
legal fees involved in workers' compensation litigation. 
This notice should be viewed as a "Letter of Understanding II 
and is intended to inform attorneys of the position of the 
commission regarding attorney fees. 
It is not the desire of this commission to regulate attorney 
fees through a "schedule ll that does not recognize lI extraordinaryll 
effort by claimants' attorneys. However, the Commission, in the 
future, will not routinely accept attorneys fees exceeding these 
guidelines, notwithstanding a contingency agreement. 
As in the past, the Commission will not approve fees based 
upon benefits already paid by the employer or surety f or upon 
uncontested benefit amounts to be paid by employer or surety prior 
to the selection of an attorney. Fees will be assessed against 
:'new moneyll only, i. e., benefits which counsel directly succeeded 
in obtaining on client I s behalf. 
As a general rule, the Commission will not approve 
claimant I s attorney fees in excess of 25% unless the case is 
Ii tigated as defined in IDAPA 17. Ol. Ol. 528 (application for hearing 
filed) . 
In litigated cases heard and decided by the Commission or 
by a designated Referee, the Commission may approve a claimant's 
attorney fee assessment to a maximum of 33 1/3%. 
In Lump Sum Settlements and other agreements I the commission 
may approve: 
1. Attorney fees up to 33 1/3% of the first $60,000 
Ilnew money" awarded. 
2. Attorney fees UP to 20% of all Ilnew money" over 
and beyond $60,000. 
It should be noted that the guidelines above are Itrule of 
thumb" maximums and should neither be construed as artificial caps 
operating against claimants' attorneys who find themselves in 
extraordinary circumstances nor as effective minimums to which you 
may bill without being asked to sUbstantiate the total amount of 
fees. Attorney fee~ assessed in all litigated cases, lump sums, 
and other agreements are subject to "case by case" review by the 
CoIIl.mission. 
IAR 72-803.2 
The Idaho Industrial Commission has undertaken an extensive 
study spanning the past year. This study has included an analysis 
of fee practices among jurisdictions nationwide with workers' 
compensation systems essentially similar to that in Idaho. Based 
upon that study, the Commission believes that the fee structure 
set forth above is among the highest 15% in the nation. Given 
Idaho's prevailing cost of living, this structure should be 
sufficiently generous to attract and retain seasoned and high 
quality members of the bar to practice in the workers' compensation 
arena. 
Idaho's workers I compensation system is an island of success 
in a sea of troubled waters, and the Commission recognizes that the 
Workers' compensation Bar contributes to that success in great 
measure. We respectfully . solicit the continued cooperation of the 
Idaho Workers' Compensation Bar as this Commission strives to 
maintain a fair and equitable compensation system for Idaho's 
working men and women. 





DOCUMENT # 5 
MINUTES 
ADMINISTRATIVE MEETING 
October 21, 1992 
The Industrial Commission met in regular session, with Chairman 
Gerald A. Geddes presiding and Commissioners Logan Lanham and Betty 
H. Richardson 1 Executive Director Gary stivers and Commission 
Secretary Patricia Ramey present. The Minutes were read and 
approved. Agenda items were discussed as follows: 
Old Business: 
1. The Commissioners reviewed the contract proposed by the 
Attorney General's Office for legal services for FY 93 and agreed 
that it was satisfactory as written. Chairman Geddes signed the 
contract and directed the Secretary to return it to the Attorney 
General's Office for the Attorney General's signature. 
2. The proposed medical fee regulation, IDAPA 17.01.03.803.B, was 
reviewed. Commissioner Richardson presented a point-by-point 
explanation of the purpose of each section of the proposed 
regulation. She emphasized that even though the regulation was 
proposed for adoption as an administrative regulation, part of it 
was essentially a judicial rule, and she recommended that part be 
adopted as such. 
After discussion, commissioner Richardson moved that the 
Commission adopt the regulation in concept, with some minor 
revisions to be made. Commissioner Geddes recommended that IDAPA 
17.01.01.432,7 be set out in the text of the regulation, as the 
regulation refers to it. Deputy Attorney General Scott Harmon 
indicated that he believes the standard must be an administrative 
regulation, but that it is appropriate to separate the procedural 
part out and make it a judicial rule. Commissioner Lanham seconded 
Commissioner Richardson's motion to adopt the regulation in concept 
and that final adoption await technical changes. The motion was 
carried. 
2. The Commissioners reviewed the proposed changes to IDAPA 
17.01.02.305, Maintaining Idaho Workers' Compensation Claim Files. 
Deputy Director Kit Furey reviewed the proceedings of the last 
meeting the Commission held regarding the regulation. commissioner 
Richardson recommended that the language from the medical fee 
regulation be cross-referenced in section i (i) of IDAPA 
17.01.02.305. Kit Furey recommended that the Commission proceed 
wi th the adoption of the amendments under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Commissioner Lanham moved that the adoption 
proceed. After discussion, Commissioner Richardson seconded the 
motion that the Commission proceed with adoption of IDAPA 
17.01.02.305. The motion was unanimously carried. 
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4. The Commissioners discussed employee leasing legislation. 
Commissioner Lanham explained the history of the legislation which 
was proposed last year and asked Deputy Director Kit Furey to draft 
legislation this year to make the actual employer (that is, the 
client of the leasing company) responsible for obtaining workers' 
compensation insurance. 
5. Deputy Director ~t Furey advised the Commissioners that the 
Annual Report was nearly completed and would be sent to the 
publisher no later than Friday, October 23. The commissioners 
unanimously agreed to the Deputy Director's proposal that no other 
changes except error corrections would be made on the proofs. 
6. The Commissioners asked Deputy Director Kit Furey to present 
her proposals pertaining to the atto:r:ney fee regulation. Ms. Furey 
recommended that the Commission not regulate attorney fees. She 
indicated that although the Commissioners believe there are 
attorneys who violate the informal administrative regulations, Ms. 
Furey believes the regulation proposed in IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D is 
too broad to resolve that problem. Ms. Furey recommended that the 
commissioners meet with the Idaho State Bar and see what could be 
worked out to resolve what the commissioners see as abuse in the 
system. She stated she felt the Commissioners' regulation of fees 
would have the ultimate effect of causing some of the best 
qualified attorneys to stop taking workers' compensation clients. 
Chairman Geddes thanked Ms. Furey for her recommendations and 
then commented that the Commission needs an attorney fee regulation 
so the attorneys know what to expect as far as fees are concerned. 
Mr. Geddes said he does not believe attorneys will be run out of 
the workers' compensation business by the regulation. He stated 
that the Commission's fee schedule in the Informal AdminIstrative 
Rule 803.2 is one of the most liberal in the country and that the 
rules had been adopted informally to keep the legislature from 
regulating attorney fees in workers' compensation matters. 
commissioner Lanham commented that other states have no 
problem regulating attorney fees. He stated that he believed 25% 
is generous I and he did not agree that fees should not be 
regulated. Mr. Lanham said he believed attorneys should be 
compensated fairly that attorneys in workers' compensation 
claims should receive 20% up to the time of calendaring, 25% if a 
hearing or mediation is held, and 30% if there has been an appeal 
to the Supreme Court. 
Ki t Furey commented that she understood there needs to be 
predictability from the Commission regarding fees, but she believed 
the marketplace should be the control over the amount. 
commissioner Richardson stated that she agreed with the Deputy 
Director that too much regulation could have a chilling effect on 
the Bar, to the disadvantage of workers' compensation claimants. 
She commented that the Commission does not inject itself into the 
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reasonableness of physician fees unless asked and that she did not 
be'lieve they should be making that determination regarding attorney 
fees unless requested to do so. She said that while attorney fees 
could be presumptively reasonable at the percentages recommended by 
Commissioner Lanham, she believed those percentages should be the 
floor rather than the ceiling on the amount of attorney fees 
awarded. 
commissioner Richardson also expressed concern that the 
Commission is only looking into claimants' attorney fees and not 
into the defendants' fees. She inquired whether Commissioner 
Lanham had any recommendations for regUlating the defense bar. 
Commissioner Lanham replied that he has received mixed signals 
about regUlating the defense bar. Chairman Geddes said he had 
heard a number of comments from claimants' attorneys recommending 
that the Commission also regulate defendants' attorney fees. Kit 
Furey commented that she believed Paul Keeton would be working on 
some legislation regarding defendants' attorney fees this session. 
Chairman Geddes recommended that the Commissioners think about 
their discussion and the proposed regUlation and discuss it again 
at their next meeting. Commissioner Richardson requested that 
proposals for changes be put in writing. 
New Business: 
1. Deputy Director Kit Furey briefly reviewed the meeting October 
19 and 20 of the Crime victims Task Force and advised the 
Commissioners that the Mental Health Advisory Committee would be 
meeting next week, October 26 and 27. 
ATTEST: 
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MINUTES 
ADMINISTRATIVE MEETING 
October 23, 1992 
The Industrial Commission met in regular session, with Chairman 
Gerald A. Geddes presiding and Commissioners Logan Lanham and Betty 
H. Richardson, Deputy Director Kit Furey and Commission secretary 
Patricia Ramey present. Agenda items were discussed as follows: 
Old Business: 
1. Two different revisions of the proposed attorney fee 
regulations were presented. At Chairman Geddes' request, Deputy 
Director Kit Furey summarized Draft #1, proposed by Commissioner 
Lanham. That draft is attached to these Minutes and made a part 
hereof by reference. Commissioner Richardson presented her own 
proposals in Draft #2 and explained the significant differences 
between Draft #1 and Draft #2. Draft #2 is attached to these 
Minutes and made a part hereof by reference. 
Commissioner Richardson expressed concern that, in many 
instances, a cap of 25% of new money on claimants' attorney fees 
may not permit claimants' attorneys to receive fair compensation 
for their efforts. She observed that because the 25% figure 
reflects a ceiling, but no floor, claimants' counsel will not be 
able to predict with reasonable certainty what fee the Commission 
would or would not approve in any given case. She said that 
counsel should have some certainty in this regard when they 
undertake to represent a client. She also expressed concern that 
such limitation may have the effect of reducing the number of 
skilled attorneys who will take workers' compensatio~ cases for 
claimants. She recommended that the Commission adopt Draft #2, 
which would establish that an attorney fee of 25% of new money 
would be presumptively reasonable, thus setting a floor, but also 
allow the Commission to allow a higher amount upon motion by a 
Claimant's attorney and where the Commiss~on finds a higher fee to 
be warranted. 
commissioner Lanham stated that under 4.a. of Draft #1, the 
Commission could award up to 30%. This provision would enable the 
Commission to allow an attorney fee of up to 30% of new money, but 
only after hearing and only on the Commission's own motion. 
Commissioner Richardson responded that adoption of 4.a. might have 
the undesirable effect of fostering more hearings and discouraging 
pre-hearing settlement. She also stated that, often, extensive 
work is done in cases which settle'and do not proceed to hearing 
and that the efforts of attorneys in 'those cases ought to be fairly 
compensated. She also said that the attorney who did the work in 
any given case is in the best position to know what time and effort 
he or she expended in representing a client and that the attorney 
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should be able to move the Commission for an order permitting a 
higher fee. 
commissioner Lanham commented that he had made a study of 
other states and that Idaho is among the highest in the United 
states at 25%, although some other states do allow 25% of the first 
$1,000.00. Commissioner Richardson responded that she has also 
reviewed the data regarding attorney fees in other jurisdictions. 
She said that many states award attorney fees based on the total 
benefits awarded, not just on "new money." Also, because of the 
wide variations in the states' workers' compensation laws and 
benefits, she believes such comparisons are of limited usefulness, 
like comparing "apples and oranges." Commissioner Richardson 
stated that she believes Idaho's workers' compensation system is 
one of the best in the country, and that is partially due to the 
fact that, presently, Idaho has a skilled workers' compensation 
bar, where, by and large, both claimants and defendants receive 
excellent representation from experienced workers' compensation 
attorneys. She said she feared that Commissioner Lanham's proposal 
would arbitrarily limit the quality of legal services available to 
those most in need of legal services but not place a similar 
limitation on defendants, who are already more sophisticated in 
their knowledge of workers' compensation laws. She also stated 
that, just because other states may not permit claimants' attorneys 
to be adequately compensated, does not mean that Idaho should 
follow suit. She noted that the Commission had heard testimony 
from practitioners familiar with attorney fee regulations in other 
jurisdictions, and they had indicated that, in many jurisdictions, 
fees were so low that few capable attorneys would undertake to 
represent workers' compensation claimants. In response to a 
question from Chairman Geddes, Commissioner Richardson stated that 
she believed that, in most cases, 25% of new money would adequately 
compensate claimants' counsel for their efforts but that in the 
smaller cases and the more complex cases, 25% of new money would 
likely be insufficient incentive to encourage skilled 
representation. 
commissioner Lanham stated that in most other states the 
legislature sets the fees and that Chairman Geddes, who has been 
with the Idaho Commission 20 years, agreed with the amount 
Commissioner Lanham recommended. 
Upon the request of Chairman Geddes, Deputy Director Kit Furey 
expressed her opinion that, although she was not in favor of the 
Commission regulating attorney fees at all, if the Commission were 
going to adopt any regulation regarding attorney fees, they should 
adopt Draft #2. She reiterated, however, that it was her 
recommendation that the Commission not regulate attorney fees. 
At the request of Chairman Geddes, Deputy Attorney General 
Scott Harmon gave his recommendations, echoing the Deputy 
Director's comments. He recommended the Commission not regulate 
attorney fees. He agreed with Commissioner Richardson and Deputy· 
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Director Kit Furey that regulation would have the effect of 
limiting the number of qualified attorneys willing to deal with 
workers' compensation cases. He stated that the point was not the 
numerosity of attorneys in the field, but the quality of those 
attorneys. Mr. Harmon also noted that the effective date at the 
bottom of the last page of Draft #1 was not correct, as, pursuant 
to the Administrative Procedure Act, the regulation would be 
effective 20 days after its adoption. 
commissioner Lanham moved that the Commission adopt Draft #1 
as written, with the effective date of November 15, 1992. Chairman 
Geddes seconded the motion. Chairman Geddes and Commissioner 
Lanham voted in favor of the adoption of the regulation set forth 
in Draft #1. Commissioner Richardson voted against it. The motion 
was carried 2 to 1. 
A question arose regarding the Disclosure statement attached 
as Appendix II to Draft #1 and whether the Idaho state Bar would be 
willing to resolve disputes arising under the regulation, as 
Commissioner Lanham recommended. Chairman Geddes asked Deputy 
Attorney General Scott Harmon to contact Michael oths and see 
whether they would be willing, so the disclosure statement could be 
completed. Commissioner Richardson stated that she thought the 
draft of the Disclosure Statement which Commissioner Lanham had 
proposed would have the adverse effect of encouraging forum 
shopping and might operate to erode what ought to be the 
Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising 
under the Workers' Compensation Law. Adoption of Appendix II was 
deferred until this question could be resolved. 
2. Commissioner Richardson presented her recommendations 
regarding the proposed medical fee regulation. The Commissioners 
agreed that finalization of the regulation could be delayed until 
a later meeting of the Commission. 
Minute.s 10-23-92 3. 
ATTEST: 
Q~ilG 
Patricia S. Ramey, S~y 
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I IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D 
REGULATION GOVERNING ATTORNEY FEES 
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS 
In order that the Idaho Industrial Commission ("commission") may 
properly and fairly discharge its responsibility pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sections 72-803 and 72-404, the Commission hereby promulgates 
the following administrative regulation pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 72-508. 
The Commission sUbstitutes this regulation for the Informal 
Administrative Rules (IAR) 72-803.1, "Reporting of Attorney Fee and 
Associated Expenses in Lump Sum Proceedings," and IAR 72-803.2, 
"Re: Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Actions," dated 
January 9, 1990. 
1. Idaho Code section 72-803 provides: 
"Claims of attorneys and physicians for medical and 
related services -- Approval. -- Claims of attorneys and 
claims for medical services and for medicine and related 
benefits shall be subject to approval by the commission." 
2. Idaho Code section 72-404 provides: 
"Lump sum payments. -- Whenever the commission determines 
that it is for the best interest of all parties, the 
liability of the employer for compensation may, on 
application to the commission by any party interested, 
be discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one 
or more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of 
the commission." 
3. "New Money" defined. "New money" as used herein shall refer 
to benefits to the claimant that counsel is responsible for 
securing through legal services rendered in connection with the 
client's workers' compensation claim. 
4. Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. 
After the effective date of this regulation, any contingent fee 
agreement between counsel and a claimant in a workers' 
compensation case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees 
~ will not exceed 25% of any new money received by the claimant, 
whether such new money is acquired pursuant to a Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement, other Agreement, Mediation, or an Award of 
the Commission. 
~a. Provided, however, that after hearing by the Commission 
and upon its own motion, the Commission may award attorney 
fees up to 30% of new money awarded. 
PROPOSED REGULATION 1. 
IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D 
b. In cases where a claimant is deemed totally and 
permanently disabled, attorney fees may be deducted from no 
more than 500 weeks of workers' compensation benefits. 
5. Fee agreements between a claimant and counsel shall be in 
writing. All fee agreements shall be in writing, and shall be 
signed by the claimant and claimant's counsel. The fee agreement 
shall be substantially in the form prescribed in Appendix II of 
this regulation. 
6. Reporting of all attorney fees and associated expenses in Lump 
Sum Settlement proceedings. Attorneys representing any party to 
a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or other Agreement submitted to the 
Commission for its approval shall set forth in the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement or other Agreement, or by letter or memorandum 
accompanying such Agreement, the following: 
a. the date upon which counsel became involved in the case; 
b. the issues then, and subsequently, in controversy; 
c. the total amount of benefits which claimant's counsel 
contends constitute "new money" as defined above and an 
itemization of those benefits; 
d. all information included in and substantially in the 
format of Appendix I hereto. 
7. Request for Hearing regarding fee disputes between counsel and 
client. Where a dispute arises between a counsel and a client 
regarding the appropriateness of an attorney fee in a workers' 
compensation proceeding, either the counselor the client may file 
with the Commission a Request for Hearing regarding the fee dispute 
and the Commission, upon receipt of such a Request, shall schedule 
a hearing on the matter. 
8. Request for Hearing regarding fee dispute between counsel and 
the Commission. Where the commission, upon review of the file and 
a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or other Agreement submitted for 
its approval, concludes that the attorney fee set forth therein 
exceeds the amount allowed in (2) above, Commission staff shall 
notify claimant's counsel in writing of the Commission's 
calculations, and where claimant's counsel disputes the 
Commission's calculations, claimant's counsel may file with the 
Commission a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting 
evidence and argument on the matter. Upon receipt of such a 
Request, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the matter. 
PROPOSED REGULATION 2. 
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Appendix 1 
THE SAMPLE LUMP SUM SEITLEMENT FORMAT SHOWN BELOW SHALL BE FOLLOWED. 
FORMAT FOR LUMP SUM SETTLEMENTS 
(A) Compensability Denied 






Total temporary 01-01-92 through 01-29-92 
(4 weeks, 1 day @ $252.50 per week) 
Retraining 01-30-92 through 04-06-92 
(9 weeks, 5 days @ $252.50 per week) 
Partial temporary 04-07-92 through 04-13-92 
$ 1,046.07 
$ 2,452.85 
(1 week @ $125.20 per week) . . . . . . . . . .. $ 125.20 
SUBTOTAL ............................... $ 3,624.12 
Permanent partial impairment 10 % of the whole person 
(50 weeks @ $198.00 per week) ................... $ 9,900.00 
Permanent partial disability 4 % of the whole person 
(20 weeks @ $198.00 per week) ................... $ 3,960.00 
Future medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3,400.00 
Lump sum consideration ................... $ 5.500.00 
SUBTOTAL ............................... $ 8,900.00 
TOTAL .................................. $ 26,384.12 
Total temporary paid ..................... $ 1,046.07 
Retraining paid ......................... $ 2,452.85 
Partial temporary payment .................. $ 125.20 
Advance ............................. $ 350.00 
SUBTOTAL ........................... $ 3,974.12 
Amount due claimant .............................. $ 22,410.00 
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CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
Claimant's counsel 
a. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS ............ $ 1,000.00 
* b. Costs taken prior to LSS (attach schedule) • • • • • • • • •• $ -0-
c. Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS ... $ 5,596.03 1,225.00 
d. Additional costs to be taken from LSS (attach schedule) •• $ 278.00 
Total claimant's fees and costs ............... $ 6,874.03 2,503.00 
Less "a." & "b." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 1.000.00 
SUBTOTAL CURRENTLY DUE TO ATTORNEY $ 5,874.03 1 ,503.00 
Outstanding medicals to be paid from 
LSS balance by claimant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ -0-
BALANCE RETAINED BY CLAIMANT ................. $ 16.535.97 20,907.00 
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
Defendant's counsel 
a. Total legal costs (attach schedule) ....... $ 854.00 
b. Total legal fees .................. $ 6,000.00 
Total defendant's fees & costs .................... $ 6,854.00 




Each period in which retraining is paid needs to be shown separately. 
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APPENDIX II 
state of Idaho 
Industrial Commission 
Client's printed name 
Attorney's printed name 
and Address 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
This statement advises you of some of your rights and responsibilities in 
a workers' compensation case. You may be able to obtain the information 
you need about your claim without hiring a lawyer. You may call a 
Compensation Consultant at the Industrial Commission. A compensation 
Consultant cannot give you legal advice, but may be able to answer your 
questions, free of charge. If you would like to speak to a compensation 
Consultant, call this toll-free number: 1-800-950-2110. 
If you decide to hire an attorney to represent you, your attorney's fees 
will be deducted from your benefits. 
In workers' compensation cases, attorney's fees normally do not exceed ( 
~~)% of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. Depending upon the 
circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher 
percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. 
You may decide you no longer wish to be represented by a lawyer and would 
prefer to represent yourself, or you may decide to hire a different lawyer 
instead. To terminate representation by your lawyer, you must send written 
notice to the lawyer, to the Industrial Commission, and to all other 
parties to your 5a.se. If you change attorneys or represent yourself, 
however, yo~~~l)still be responsible for paying attorney fees 
represeI}tin<;f \t~ir value of any work the attorney signing below 
pertormed in your case. 
~--i:';/yOU and your attorney have a dispute regarding atto. rney fees,/ you may 
'/ petition the(CB~si;.1J ~lve the disput~~~ __ " __ -" B:~Y/ 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement. 
Employee's Signature ________________________________________________ __ 
Date __________________________________________ __ 
Attorney's Signature ________________________________________________ __ 
Date -------------------------------------------
N071CE TO ATTORNEY 
Givt: a copy to !he client and send a copy to the Industrial Commission within 
7 days of a:ecution by the client. 
Any person who wilfolly makes a false statemmt or representation for the purpose of obtaining arry benefit or payment under me 
provisions of the Idoho Workers' Compensation Law shalllx guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction for such offense, shall foridt 
all right 10 compensation under that law. 





REGULATION GOVERNING ATTORNEY FEES 
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS 
In order that the Idaho Industrial Commission ("Commission") may 
properly and fairly discharge its responsibility pursuant to Idaho 
Code sections 72-803, 72-804 and 72-404, the Commission hereby 
promulgates the following administrative regulation pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 72-508. 
The Commission sUbstitutes this regulation for the Informal 
Administrative Rules (IAR) 72-803.1, "Reporting of Attorney Fee and 
Associated Expenses in Lump Sum Proceedings," and IAR 72-803.2, 
"Re: Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Actions," dated 
January 9, 1990. 
1. Idaho Code section 72-803 provides: 
"Claims of attorneys and physicians for medical and 
related services -- Approval. -- Claims of attorneys and 
claims for medical services and for medicine and related 
benefits shall be subject to approval by the commission." 
2. Idaho Code Section-72-404 provides: 
"Lump sum payments. -- Whenever the commission determines 
that it is for the best interest of all parties, the 
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liability of the employer for compensation may, on 
application to the commission by any party interested, be 
discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or 
more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the 
commission." 
3. "New Honey" defined. "New money" as used herein shall refer 
to benefits to the claimant that counsel is responsible for 
securing through legal services rendered in connection with the 
client's workers' compensation claim. 
4. Reasonableness of Attorney Fees. After the effective date of 
this regulation, a contingent fee in a workers' compensation case 
shall be presumed reasonable and shall be approved, 
a. where such fee does not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) 
of "new money" and the case is settled or benefits are paid 
pr ior to the point the case is fully submitted to the 
commission for decision; 1 
1 CoJlUllent: The presumptive figures are floors. In other words, the 
Commission shall not disapprove a fee equal to the presumptive amount applicable, 
but it may approve fees higher than the presumptive amount applicable upon a 
showing by claimant's counsel that such a fee is otherwise justified. Factors 
which the Commission may consider in determining whether a fee higher than the 
presumptive amount applicable is justified include: the time and labor required 
to perform the legal servicQs properly; the novelty and difficulty of the legal 
issues involved in the matter; the fees the individual attorney customarily 
charges for similar legal services in matters et!~r than workers' compensation 
matters; the fees other Idaho attorneys customarily charge for similar legal 
services in matters other than workers' compensation matters; the possible total 
recovery if claimant is successful; the time limitations imposed by the client 
or circumstances of the case; the nature and length of the attorney-client 
relationship; the attorney's experience, skill and reputation; the client' s 
ability to pay for the legal services; the risk of no recovery; the extent to 
which counsel'S ~epresentation of the matter encourages full enforcement of the 
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b. where such fee does not exceed thirty-three and one-third 
percent (33 1/3%) of "new money" and the case is settled or 
benefits are paid after the point the case is fully submitted 
to the Commission for decision and is under advisement. 2 
5. Fee agreements between a claimant and counsel shall be in 
writing. All fee agreements shall be in writing and shall be 
signed by the claimant and claimant I s counsel and prior to the 
execution of any fee agreement, the attorney shall furnish his/her 
client with the Disclosure statements appended hereto as Appendix 
II. 
6. Reporting of all attorney fees and associated expenses in Lump 
Sum Settlement proceedings. Attorneys representing any party to a 
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or other Agreement submitted to the 
commission for its approval shall set forth in the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement or other Agreement, or by letter or memorandum 
accompanying such Agreement, the following: 
a. the date upon which counsel became involved in the case; 
b. the issues then, and subsequently, in controversy; 
defendant (s) , underlying statutory duties by assuring that, in a practical sense, 
the remedies set forth in the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act will be available 
to aggrieved persons; the costs and attorney fees incurred by defendant(s) in 
contesting the matter; and any other factor which is relevant to furthering the 
legislative intent behind the Workers' Compensation Act. 
2 Comment: "The point the case is fully submit tad to the Commission for 
decision" means the point when the last brief has been filed. 
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c. the total amount of benefits which claimant's counsel 
contends constitute "new money" as defined above and an 
itemization of those benefits; 
d. all information included in and substantially in the 
format of Appendix I hereto. 
7. Request for Hearing regarding fee disputes between counsel and 
client. Where a dispute arises between a counsel and a client 
regarding the appropriateness of an attorney fee in a workers' 
compensation proceeding, either the counselor the client may file 
with the Commission a Request for Hearing regarding the fee dispute 
and the commission, upon receipt of such a Request, shall schedule 
a hearing on the matter. 
8. Request for Hearing regarding fee dispute between counsel and 
the Commission. Where the commission, upon review of the file and 
a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or other Agreement submitted for 
its approval, concludes that the attorney fee set forth therein 
exceeds the amount allowed in (2) above, Commission staff shall 
notify claimant's counsel in writing of the Commission's 
calculations, and where claimant's counsel disputes the 
Commission's calculations, claimant's counsel may file with the 
Commission a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting 
evidence and argument on the matter. Upon receipt of such a 
Request, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the matter. 
Oct 23, 1992 1:18 pm 4. 
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Appendix 1 
THE SAMPLE LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT FORMAT SHOWN BELOW SHALL BE FOllOWED. 
FORMA T FOR LUMP SUM SETTLEl\1ENTS 
(A) Compensability Denied 






Total temporary 01-01-92 through 01-29-92 
(4 weeks, 1 day @ $252.50 per week) 
Retraining 01-3.Q-92 through 04-06-92 
(9 weeks, 5 days @ $252.50 per week) 
Partial temporary 04-07-92 through 04-13-92 
$ 1,046.07 
$ 2,452.85 
(1 week @ $125.20 per week) . . . . . . . . . .. $ 125.20 
SUBTOTAL ............................... $ 3,624.12 
Permanent partial impairment 10% of the whole person 
(50 weeks @ $198.00 per week) ................... $ 9,900.00 
Permanent partial disability 4 % of the whole person 
(20 weeks @ $198.00 per week) ................... $ 3,960.00 
Future medical ......................... $ 3,400.00 
Lump sum consideration ................... $ 5,500.00 
SUBTOTAL ............................... $ 8,900.00 
TOTAL .................................. $ 26,384.12 
Total temporary paid ..................... $ 1,046.07 
Retraining paid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 2,452.85 
Partial temporary payment .................. $ 125.20 
Advance ........... : ................. $ 350.00 
SUBTOTAL ........................... $ 3,974.12 
Amount due claimant $ 22,410.00 
IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D 
Appendix 1 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
Claimant's counsel 
a. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 1,000.00 
* b. Costs taken prior to LSS (attach schedule) • • • • • • • • •• $ -0-
c. Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS ... $ 5,596.03 
d. Additional costs to be taken from LSS (attach schedule) •• $ 278.00 
Total claimant's fees and costs ............... $ 6,874.03 
Less !la." & "b. II •••••••••••••••••••••••• $ 1,000.00 
SUBTOTAL CURRENTLY DUE TO ATTORNEY 




LSS balance by claimant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ -0-
1,503.00 
BALANCE RETAINED BY CLAIMANT ................. $ 16.535.97 20,907.00 
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
Defendant's counsel 
a. Total legal costs (attach schedule) ....... $ 854.00 
b. Total legal fees .................. $ 6,000.00 
Total defendant's fees & costs .................... $ 6,854.00 
* NOTE: Each period of disability in which the TID or PTD rate changes needs to be 
shown separately. 
pr:admin!attyfee.apx 
10123192 9:49 am 
Each period in which retraining is paid needs to be shown separately. 
state of Idaho 
Industrial Commission 
Client's printed name 





This statement advises you of some of your rights and responsibilities in 
a workers' compensation case. You may be able to obtain the information 
you need about your claim without hiring a lawyer. You may call a 
Compensation Consultant at the Industrial Commission. A Compensation 
Consultant cannot give you legal advice, but may be able to answer your 
questions, free of charge. If you would like to speak to a compensation 
consultant, call this toll-free number: 1-800-950-2110. 
If you decide to hire an attorney to represent you, your attorney's fees 
will be deducted from your benefits. 
In workers' compensation cases, attorney's fees normally do not exceed ( 
)% of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. Depending upon the 
circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher 
percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. 
You may decide you no longer wish to be represented by a lawyer and would 
prefer to represent yourself, or you may decide to hire a different lawyer 
instead. To terminate representation by your lawyer, you must send written 
notice to the lawyer, to the Industrial commission, and to all other 
parties to your case. If you change attorneys or represent yourself, 
however, you will still be responsible for paying attorney fees 
representing the fair value of any work the attorney signing below 
performed in your case. 
If you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, you may 
petition the commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement. 
Employee's Signature 
Date __________________________________________ __ 
Attorney's Signature 
Date ________________________________________ ___ 
N07ICE ro ATTOR.NEY 
Give a copy to the client and send a copy to the Industrial Commission within 
7 days of execution by the client. 
Any person who wilfUlly makes a faL~e statement or representation for the purpose of obtaining any benefit or payment under the 
provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction for such offense, shall foifeit 
all right to compensation under that law. 
wp5file\disclosu.psr Oct 23, 1992 4:18pm 
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMI~SION 
317 Main Street 
Boise, ID 83720-6000 
(208) 334~6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321 
RULE CERTIFICATION AND NOTICE OF FILING 
IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D 
REGULATION GOVERNING ATTORNEY FEES 
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS 
Cecil D. Andrus 
Governor 
COMMISSIONERS 
"Gerald A. Geddes 
Chairman 
Logan E. Lanham 
Betty H. Richardson 
Gary W. Stivers 
Executive Director 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
Industrial Commission of the state of Idaho hereby certifies the 
adoption of IDAPA 17.01. 01. 803 .D, Regulation Governing Attorney 
Fees in Workers' Compensation Proceedings, which limits fees paid 
to claimants' attorneys to no more than 25% of any "new money" 
received by a claimant as a result of the attorney's efforts and 
provides that, in cases where a claimant is deemed totally and 
permanently disabled, the claimant's attorney may deduct fees from 
no more than 500 weeks of the claimant's workers' compensation 
benefits. 
Public notice of the intended adoption of this ~ule was published 
in six newspapers statewide during the weeks of August 10, 17, and 
24, 1992. Public hearings were held September 1, 1992, in Boise; 
September 2, 1992, in Pocatello; September 3, 1992, in Idaho Falls; 
September 8, 1992, in Twin Falls; September 15, 1992, in Lewiston; 
and September 16, 1992, in Coeur d'Alene. Written testimony was 
also received through September 30, 1992. 
NOw, pursuant to the provisions of IDAHO CODE §67-5203, IDAPA 
17.01.01.803.D is hereby CERTIFIED and FILED this 23rd day of 
October 1992, to become effective November 15, 1992. 
Equal Opportunity Employer 
DOCUMENT # 8 
IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D 
REGULATION GOVERNING ATTORNEY FEES 
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS 
In order that the Idaho Industrial Commission (IICommission fl ) may 
properly and fairly discharge its responsibility pursuant to Idaho 
Code sections 72-803 and 72-404, the Commission hereby promulgates 
the following administrative regulation pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 72-508. 
The Commission substitutes this regulation for the Informal 
Administrative Rules (IAR) 72-803.1, "Reporting of Attorney Fee and 
Associated Expenses in Lump Sum Proceedings," and IAR 72-803.2, 
liRe: Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Actions," dated 
January 9, 1990. 
1. Idaho Code Section 72-803 provides: 
"Claims of attorneys and physicians for medical and 
related services -- Approval. -- Claims of attorneys and 
claims for medical services and for medicine and related 
benefits shall be subject to approval by the commission." 
2. Idaho Code section 72-404 provides: 
"Lump sum payments. -- Whenever the commission determines 
that it is for the best interest of all parties, the 
liabili ty of the employer for compensation may, on 
application to the commission by any party interested, be 
discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or 
more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the 
commission." 
3. "New Money" defined. "New money" as used herein shall refer 
to monetary benefits to the claimant that counsel is responsible 
for securing through legal services rendered in connection with the 
client's workers' compensation claim. 
4. Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. 
After the effective date of this regulation, any contingent fee 
agreement between counsel and a claimant in a workers' compensation 
case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed 
25% of any new money received by the claimant, whether such new 
money is acquired pursuant to a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, 
other Agreement, Mediation, or an Award of the Commission. 
a. Provided, however, that after hearing by the Commission 
and upon its own motion, the Commission may award attorney 
fees up to 30% of new money awarded. . 
b. In cases where a claimant is deemed totally and 
permanently disabled, attorney fees may be deducted from no 
more than 500 weeks of workers' compensation benefits. 
IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D Effective 12/1/92 1. 
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5. Fee agreements between a claimant and counsel shall be in 
writinq. All fee agreements shall be in writing and shall be 
signed by the claimant and claimant's counsel. A disclosure 
statement in substantially the form prescribed in Appendix II of 
this regulation shall be provided to claimant at the time of 
signing the fee agreement. 
6. Reportinq of all attorney fees and associated expenses in Lump 
Sum Settlement proceedings. Attorneys representing any party to a 
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or other Agreement submitted to the 
commission for its approval shall set forth in the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement or other Agreement, or by letter or memorandum 
accompanying such Agreement, the following: 
a. the date upon which counsel became involved in the case; 
b. the issues then, and subsequently, in controversy; 
c. the total amount of benefits which claimant's counsel 
contends constitute "new money" as defined above and an 
itemization of those benefits; 
d. all information included in and substantially in the 
format of Appendix I hereto. 
7. Request for Hearing regarding fee disputes between counsel and 
client. Where a dispute arises between a counsel and a client 
regarding the appropriateness of an attorney fee in a workers' 
compensation proceeding, either the counselor the client may file 
with the Commission a Request for Hearing regarding the fee dispute 
and the Commission, upon receipt of such a Request, shall schedule 
a hearing on the matter. 
8. Request for Hearing regarding fee dispute between counsel and 
the commission. Where the Commission, upon review of the file and 
a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or other Agreement submitted for 
its approval, concludes that the attorney fee set forth therein 
exceeds the amount allowed in (2) above, Commission staff shall 
notify claimant's counsel in writing of the Commission's 
calculations, and where claimant's counsel disputes the 
Commission's calculations, claimant's counsel may file with the 
Commission a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting 
evidence and argument on the matter. Upon receipt of such a 
Request, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the matter. 






THE SAMPLE LUMP SUM SEITLEMENT FORMAT SHOWN BELOW SHALL BE FOLLOWED. 
FORMAT FOR LUMP SUM SETTLEMENTS 
(A) Compensability Denied 
(B) Compensability Admitted 
Total temporary 01-01-92 through 01-29-92 
(4 weeks, 1 day @ $252.50 per week) . . . . .. $ 1,046.07 
Retraining 01-30-92 through 04-06-92 
(9 weeks, 5 days @ $252.50 per week) ..... $ 2,452.85 
Partial temporary 04-07-92 through 04-13-92 
(1 week @ $125.20 per week) . . . . . . . . . .. $ 125.20 
SUBTOTAL ............................... $ 3,624.12 
Permanent partial impairment 10 % of the whole person 
(50 weeks @ $198.00 per week) ................... $ 9,900.00 
Permanent partial disability 4 % of the whole person 
(20 weeks @ $198.00 per week) ................... $ 3,960.00 
Future medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3,400.00 
Lump sum consideration ................... $ 5,500.00 
SUBTOTAL ............................... $ 8,900.00 
TOTAL .................................. $ 26,384.12 
Less: 
Total temporary paid .................... , $ 1,046.07 
Retraining paid ......................... $ 2,452.85 
Partial temporary payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 125.20 
Advance .. : .......................... $ 350.00 
SUBTOTAL ........................... $ 3.974.12 
Amount due claimant .............................. $ 22,410.00 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 




a. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS ............ $ 1,000.00 
* b. Costs taken prior to LSS (attach schedule) • • • • • • • • " $ -0-
c. Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS ... $ 5,596.03 1,225.00 
d. Additional costs to be taken from LSS (attach schedule) •• $ 278.00 
Total claimant's fees and costs ............... $ 6,874.03 2,503.00 
Less "a." & "b." ........................ $ 1,000.00 
SUBTOTAL CURRENTLY DUE TO ATTORNEY $ 5,874.03 1,503.00 
Outstanding medicals to be paid from 
LSS balance by claimant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "'----"''---
BALANCE RETAINED BY CLAIMANT ................. $ 16,535.97 20,907.00 
DEF1Th1J)ANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
Defendant's counsel 
a. Total1egal costs (attach schedule) ....... $ 854.00 
b. Total legal fees .................. $ 6.000.00 
Total defendant's fees & costs .................... $ 6,854.00 
* NOTE: Each period of disability in which the TID or PTD rate changes needs to be 
shown separately. 
Each period in which retraining is paid needs to be shown separately. 
IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D Effective 12/1/92 4. 
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This statement advises you of some of your rights and responsibilities in 
a workers' compensation case. You may be able to obtain the information 
you need about your claim without hiring a lawyer. You may call a 
Compensation Consultant at the Industrial Commission. A Compensation 
Consultant cannot give you legal advice, but may be able to answer your 
questions, free of charge. If you would like to speak to a Compensation 
Consultant, call this toll-free number: 1-800-950-2110. 
If you decide to hire an attorney to represent you, your attorney's fees 
will be deducted from your benefits. 
In workers' compensation cases, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 25% 
of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. Depending upon the 
circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher 
percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. 
You may decide you no longer wish to be represented by a lawyer and would 
prefer to represent yourself, or you may decide to hire a different lawyer 
instead. To terminate representation by your lawyer, you must send written 
notice to the lawyer, to the Industrial commission, and to all other 
parties to your case. If you change attorneys or represent yourself, 
however, you may still be responsible for paying attorney fees representing 
the fair value of any work the attorney signing below performed in your 
case. 
If you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, you may 
petition the commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement. 
Client's Signature ________________________________________________ _ 
Date --------------------------------------------
Attorney's Signature 
Date ________________________________________ ___ 
NOTICE 11') if'fTORNlrr 
Give a copy to the client and smd a copy to the Industrial Commission within 
7 days of execution by the client. 
Any person who wilfolly maks a faise statanent or represmtanon for the purpose of obtaining any benefit or payment IlTIIkr the 
provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon convicnonfor such offense, shall forfeit 
all right to compensation under that law .. 
IDAPA 17.01.01.803.D Effective 12/1/92 5. 
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17.02.08· MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
These rules are adopted and promulgated by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the provision of Section 72-508, 
Idaho Code. (7-6-94) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
These rules shall be cited as lDAPA 17.02.08, "Miscellaneous Provisions". (7-6-94) 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRETATIONS. 
No written interpretations of these rules exist. (7-6-94) 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. 
There is no administrative appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission in workers' compensation matters, as 
the Commission is exempted from contested-cases provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. (7-6-94) 
004. -- 030. (RESERVED). 
031. ACCEPTABLE CHARGES FOR MEDICAL SERVICES VNDER THE IDAHO WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LAW. 
Pursuant to Section 72-508 and Section 72-803, Idaho Code, the Industrial Commission (hereinafter "the 
Commission") hereby substitutes the following for the January 28, 1975 amendment to the "Rules and Regulations 
Governing Charges for Medical Services Provided under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law," dated May 2, 
1973: 
(6-1-92) 
01. Acceptable Charges Under The Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. Payors shall pay a 
Provider's reasonable charge for Medical Services furnished to industrially injured patients. (6-1-92) 
02. Definitions. Words and tenns used in this rule are defined in the subsections which follow. (6-1-
92) 
a. "Provider" means any person, finn, corporation, partnership, association, agency, institution or 
other legal entity providing any kind of Medical Services related to the treatment of an industrially injured patient 
which are compensable under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law. (6-1-92) 
b. "Payor" means the legal entity responsible for paying medical benefits under Idaho's Workers' 
Compensation Law. (6-1-92) 
c. "Medical Services" means medical, surgical, dental or other attendance or treatment, nurse and 
hospital service, medicines, apparatus, appliances, prostheses, and related services, facilities, equipment and supplies. 
(7-1-95) 
d. "Reasonable," except as provided in Subsections 031.02.g. and 031.02.h., means a charge does not 
exceed the Provider's "usual" charge and does not exceed the "customary" charge, as defined below. (7-1-95) 
e. "Usual" means the most frequent charge made by an individual Provider for a given service to non-
industrially injured patients. (7-1-95) 
f. "Customary" means a charge which shall have an upper limit no higher than the 90th percentile, as 
determined by the Commission, of usual charges made by Idaho Providers for a given service. (7-1-95) 
g. Provided, however, that for medical services which are not represented by CPT codes, 
reasonableness of charges shall be determined based on all relevant evidence available, including industry standards, 
invoices and catalog prices. (7-1-95) 
Page 2 
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h. Provided, fUl1her, that where a Medical Service is one that is exceptional, unusual, variable, rarely 
provided, or so new that a determination cannot be made as to whether the charge for the Medical Service meets the 
criteria of Subsections 031.02.d. through 031.02.f. above, or where the Industrial Commission staff determines that 
its database is statistically unreliable, reasonableness of charges shall be detennined based on all relevant evidence 
available. (7-1-95) 
032. BILLING AND PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 
PRELIMINARY TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION. 
01. Authority And Definitions. Pursuant to Section 72-508 and Section 72-803, Idaho Code, the 
Industrial Commission hereby promulgates this rule augmenting IDAPA 17.02.08.031 (formerly 17.01.03.803.A, 
which became effective June I, 1992). The definitions set forth in IDAPA 17.02.08.031 are incorporated by reference 
as if fully set forth herein. (1-1-93) 
02. Time Periods. None of the periods herein shall begin to run before the Notice of Injury/Claim for 
Benefits has been filed with the Employer as required by law. (1-1-93) 
03. Provider To Furnish Information. A Provider, when submitting a bill to a Payor, shall inform the 
Payor of the nature and extent of Medical Services furnished and for which the bill is submitted. This information 
shall include, but is not limited to, the patient's name, the employer's name, the date the Medical Service was 
provided, the diagnosis, if any, and the amount of the charge or charges. (1-1-93) 
a. CPT and lCD Coding. A Provider's bill shall, whenever possible, describe the Medical Service 
provided, using the American Medical Association's appropriate Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) coding, 
including modifiers, for the year in which the service was performed and using current International Classification of 
Diseases (lCD) diagnostic coding, as well. (7-1-95) 
b. Contact Person. The bill shall also contain the name, address and telephone number of the 
individual the Payor may contact in the event the Payor seeks additional information regardi:1g the Provider's bill. 
(1-1-93) 
c. Report to Accompany Bill. Tf required by the Payor, the bill shall be accompanied by a written 
report as defined by IDAPA 17.02.04.322.01.f. Where a bill is not accompanied by such Report, the periods 
expressed in Subsections 032.04 and 032.06, below, shall not begin to run until the Payor receives the Report. (7-1-
95) 
04. Prompt Payment. If the Payor acknowledges liability for the claim and does not send a 
Preliminary Objection to, or Request for Clarification of, any charge, as provided in Subsection 032.06, below, the 
Payor shall pay the charge within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the bill. The Commission will strictly apply 
all time limits and deadlines established by this rule. However, a reasonable good faith effort to comply with the other 
provisions of this rule will generally be sufficient to protect a party's rights hereunder. (1-1-93) 
05. Partial Payment. If the Payor acknowledges liability for the claim and, pursuant to Subsection 
032.06 below, sends a Preliminary Objection, a Request for Clarification, or both, as to only part of a Provider'S bill, 
the Payor must pay the charge or charges, or portion thereof, as to which no Preliminary Objection and/or Request for 
Clarification has been made, within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the bill. The Commission will strictly apply 
all time limits and deadlines established by this rule. However, a reasonable good faith effort to comply with the other 
provisions of this rule will generally be sufficient to protect a party's rights hereunder. (7-1-95) 
06. Preliminary Objections And Requests For Clarification. (1-1-93) 
a. Preliminary Objection. Whenever a Payor objects to all or any part of a Provider's bill on the 
ground that such bill contains a charge or charges that do not comport with the applicable administrative rule, the 
Payor shall send a written Preliminary Objection to the Provider within thirty (30) calendar days of the Payor's receipt 
of the bill explaining the basis for each ofthe Payor's objections. (1-1-93) 
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b. Request for Clarification. Where the Payor requires additional information, the Payor shall send a 
written Request for Clarification to the Provider within thirty (30) calendar days of the Payor's receipt of the bill, and 
shall specifically describe the information sought. (1-1-93) 
c. Provider Contact. Each Preliminary Objection and Request for Clarification shall contain the name, 
address and phone number of the individual the Provider may contact regarding the Preliminary Objection or Request 
for Clarification. (1-1-93) 
d. Failure of Payor to Object or Request. Where a Payor does not send a Preliminary Objection to a 
charge set forth in a bill andlor a Request for Clarification within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of the bill, it 
shall be precluded from objecting to such charge as failing to comport with the applicable administrative rule. 
(1-1-93) 
07. Provider Reply To Preliminary Objection And/Or Request For Clarification. (1-1-93) 
a. Where a Payor has timely sent a Preliminary Objection, Request for Clarification, or both, the 
Provider shall send to the Payor a written Reply, if any it has, within thil1y (30) calendar days of the Provider's receipt 
of each Preliminary Objection and/or Request for Clarification. (1-1-93) 
b. Failure of Provider to Reply to Preliminary Objection. If a Provider fails to timely reply to a 
Preliminary Objection, the Provider shall be deemed to have acquiesced in the Payor's objection. (1-1-93) 
c. Failure of Provider to Reply to Request for Clarification. If a Provider fails to timely reply to a 
Request for Clarification, the period in which the Payor shall payor issue a Final Objection shall not begin to run 
until such clarification is received. (1-1-93) 
08. Payor Shall Pay Or Issue Final Objection. The Payor shall pay the Provider's bill in whole or in 
part and/or shall send to the Provider a written Final Objection, if any it has, to all or pm1 ofthe bill within thi11y (30) 
calendar days ofthe Payor's receipt of the Reply. (1-1-93) 
09. Failure Of Payor To Finally Object. Where the Payor does not timely send a Final Objection to 
any charge or portion thereof to which it continues to have an objection, it shall be precluded from further objecting 
to such charge as unacceptable. (1-1-93) 
10. Investigation Of Claim Compensability. Where a Payor is investigating the compensability of a 
claim as to which a Provider has submitted a bill, the Payor must send a Notice of Investigation of Claim 
Compensability to the Provider and the Patient within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt of the Provider's bill. The 
Payor shall complete its investigation of claim compensability and notify the Commission, the Provider and the 
Patient of its determination within thil1y (30) calendar days of the date the Notice of Investigation of Claim 
Compensability is sent. Where a Payor does not timely notify the Commission, the Provider and the Patient of its 
determination, the Payor shall be precluded from objecting to such charge as failing to comport with the applicable 
administrative rule. (1-1-93) 
a. Single Objection Sufficient. A single objection stating that liability has been denied shall be 
sufficient for each Providcr from whom a bill is received. (1-1-93) 
b. Effect of Commission Determination of Claim Compensability. The thirty (30) day period in which 
the Payor must pay the bill or send a Preliminary Objection and/or Request for Clarification shall recommence 
running on the date of entry of a final Commission order detem1ining that the claim is compensable. (1-1-93) 
c. Effect of Determination of Compensability. If the Payor, absent a Commission determination of 
claim compensability, concludes that it is liable for a claim, the thirty (30) day period in which the Payor must pay the 
bill or send a Preliminary Objection and/or Request for Clarification shall begin running on the date the Payor notifies 
the Commission, Provider and Patient that it accepts liability for the claim. (1-1-93) 
11. Dispute Resolution Process. If, after completing the applicable steps set forth above, a Payor and 
Provider are unable to agree on the appropriate charge for any Medical Service, a Provider which has complied with 
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the applicable requirements of this rule may move the Commission to resolve the dispute as provided in the Judicial 
Rule Re: Disputes Between Providers and Payers as Referenced in IDAPA 17.02.08.031 and 032 (formerly 
]7.01.03.803.a. and 803.b.). (1-1-93) 
12. Requirements Regarding Disputes Arising Before The Effective Date Of This Rule. (1-1-93) 
a. Written Demand Required. Tf, prior to January 1, 1993, a Payor notifies or has notified a Provider 
that it does not intend to fully pay any charge for Medical Services incurred prior to January 1, 1993, the Providcr 
seeking payment for such charge must send a written Demand for Payment to the Payor no later than January 31, 
1993. (Note: Should the matter ultimately proceed to the dispute resolution phase set forth in the Judicial Rule, the 
Commission will resolve the dispute by applying the administrative rule which was in effect at the time the charge 
was incurred. Hence, if the charge in dispute was incurred prior to June 1, 1992, the Commission will use this dispute 
resolution process to determine whether the Provider's charge is acceptablc pursuant to the provisions of IDAPA 
17.01.03.803, then in effect. However, if the charge in dispute was incurred on or after June I, 1992, the Commission 
will use this dispute resolution process to determine whether the Provider's charge is acceptable pursuant to the 
provisions of IDAPA 17.02.08.031, now in effect.) (1-1-93) 
b. All Provisions of this Rule Will Apply. Such a Demand shall substitute for the bill and Report 
referenced in Subsection 032.03 above, and must contain all the inforn1ation required by that section. Service of a 
timely Demand for Payment will bring the other provisions of this rule into operation. (1-1-93) 
c. Failure of Provider to Make Written Demand. Providers failing to make a written Demand for 
Payment within thirty (30) calendar days of the effective date of this rule shall be forever barred from invoking the 
Dispute Resolution Process set forth in the applicable Judicial Rule. Demands and/or billings submitted previously 
either to the Payor or to the Commission will not suffice. (1-1-93) 
033. RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
CASES. 
01. Authority And Definitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707, 72-735 and 72-803, 
ldaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval of attorney fees. (7 -1-94) 
a. "Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. 1-94) 
b. "Approval by Commission" means the Commission has approved the attorney fees in conjunction 
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper 
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved. (7 -1-94) 
c. "Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: (7 -1-94) 
1. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; (7-1-94) 
11. Thc services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the 
attomey seeks to be paid; (7-1-94) 
client; 
lll. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the 
(7-1-94) 
lV. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the 
fund was raised; and (7-1-94) 
lien. 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging 
(7-1-94) 
d. "Fee agreement" means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and 
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in confonnity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (lRPC). (7-1-94) 
e. "Reasonable" means that an attorney's fees are consistent with the fee agreement and are to be 
satisfied from available funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5. (7-1-94) 
1. In a case in which no hearing on the merits has been held, twenty-five percent (25%) of available 
funds shall be presumed reasonable; or (7-1-94) 
11. In a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (JRP), Rules X and XI, thirty percent (30%) of available funds shall be presumed reasonable; 
or (7-1-94) 
111. In any case in which compensation is paid for total permanent disability, fifteen percent (15%) of 
such disabili ty compensation after ten (10) years from date such total permanent disability payments commenced. 
(7-1-94) 
02. Statement Of Charging Lien. (7-1-94) 
a. All requests. for approval offees shall be deemed requests for approval ofa charging lien. (7-1-94) 
b. An attorney representing a claimant in a Workers' Compensation matter shall in any proposed lump 
sum settlement, or upon request of the Commission, file with the Commission, and serve the claimant with a copy of 
the fee agreement, and an affidavit or memorandum containing: (7-1-94) 
1. 
ii. 
The date upon which the attomey became involved in the matter; 
Any issues which were undisputed at the time the attorney became involved; 
(7-1-94) 
(7-1-94) 
iii. The total dollar value of all compensation paid or admitted as owed by employer immediately prior 




Disputed issues that arose subsequent to the date the attorney was hired; 
Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes available funds; 




vii. The statement of the attorney identifying with reasonable detail his or her fulfillment of each 
element ofthe charging lien. (7 -1-94) 
c. Upon receipt and a detennination of compliance with this Rule by the Commission by reference to 
its staff, the Commission may issue an Order Approving Fees without a hearing. (7-1-94) 
03. Procedure If Fees Are Determined Not To Be Reasonable. (7-1-94) 
a. Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission will designate staff members to 
detennine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staffs infonnal 
determination, which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable. Omission 
of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute grounds for an informal determination that the fee 
requested is not reasonable. (7 -1-94) 
b. If counsel disagrees with the Commission staffs informal determination, counsel may file, within 
fourteen (14) days of the date of the determination, a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence and 
argument on the matter. Upon receipt of the Request for Hearing, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the 
matter. A Request for Hearing shall be treated as a motion under Rule III ( e), JRP. (7 -1-94) 
c. The Commission shall order an employer to release any available funds in excess of those subject 
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to the requested charging lien and may order payment offees subject to the charging lien which have been determined 
to be reasonable. (7-1-94) 
d. The proponent of a fee which is greater than the percentage of recovery stated in Subsections 
0330I.e.i., 033.0I.e.ii., or 033.0I.e.iii. shall have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence 
entitlement to the greater fee. The attomey shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness of his or her fee. (7-1-94) 
04. Disclosure. Upon retention, the attorney shall provide to claimant a copy of a disclosure statement. 
No fee may be taken from a claimant by an attomey on a contingency fee basis unless the claimant acknowledges 
receipt of the disclosure by signing it. Upon request by the Commission, an attorney shall provide a copy of the 
signed disclosure statement to the Commission. The tem1S ofthe disclosure may be contained in the fee agreement, so 
long as it contains the text of the numbered paragraphs one (I) and two (2) of the disclosure. A copy of the agreement 
must be given to the client. The disclosure statement shall be in a fonnat substantially similar to the following: 
Client's name printed or typed 
Attorney's name and address 
printed or typed 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
State of Idaho 
Industrial Commission 
(7-1-94) 
I. Tn workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in 
which a hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty percent (30%) of the 
benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attomey may agree to a higher or lower 
percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute 
regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition the Commission to resolve the dispute. 
1 certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement. 
Client's Signature Date 
Attorney's Signature Date 
05. Effective Dates. Clauses i., ii., and iii. of Subsection 033.0I.e. are effective as to fee agreements 
entered into on and after December 1, 1992. All other provisions shall be effective on and after December 20, 1993. 
(7-1-94) 
034. -- 060. (RESERVED). 
061. RULE GOVERNING NOTICE TO CLAIMANTS OF STATUS CHANGE PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 72-806, IDAHO CODE. 
01. Notice Of Change Of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, a worker 
shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of status or condition. (1-6-92) 
02. By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be given 
by: the surety if the employer has secured Workers' Compensation Insurance; or the employer if the employer is self-
insured; or the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance. (1-6-92) 
03. Form Of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed 
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within ten (l0) days by regular United States Mail to the last known address of the as shown in the records of 
the party required to give notice as set fOlih above. The Notice shall be given on IC Fonn 8, as prescribed by the 
Commission for this purpose, as substantially set forth below: (1-6-92) 
IC Form 8: 
NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUS 
Injured Worker SSN 
Date of Injury 
Employer 
Insurance Company 
Address State Zip 
This is to notify you of the denial or change of status of your workers' compensation claim as indicated in the 
statement checked below. 
Your claim is denied. 
Reason 
Your benefit payments will bereducedincreased 
Effective date 
Reason 
Your benefit payments will be stopped. 
Reason 
Your claim is being investigated. 




See attached medical reports 
Signature of insurance company adjuster/examiner 
Name (typed or printed) 
A sample copy of IC Fonn 8 is available from the; 
Industrial Commission 
317 Main Street 
P. O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
telephone (208) 334-6000. 
EffectiYe date 
date 
04. Medical Reports. As required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, if the change is based on a medical 
report, the party giving notice shall attach a copy of the report to the notice. (1-6-92) 
05. Copies Of Notice. The party giving notice pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall send a 
copy of any such notice to the Industrial Commission, the employer, and the worker's attomey, if the worker is 
represented, at the same time notice is sent to the worker. (1-6-92) 
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17.02.08 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
These rules are adopted and promulgated by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the provision of Section 72-508, 
Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
These rules shall be cited as IDAPA 17.02.08, "Miscellaneous Provisions." 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRETATIONS. 
No written interpretations of these rules exist. 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. 
(4-7-11) 
(4-7-11) 
There is no administrative appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission in workers' compensation matters, as 
the Commission is exempted from contested-cases provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. (4-7 -11) 
004. INCORPORA TION BY REFERENCE. 
No documents have been incorporated by reference into these rules. (4-7-11) 
005. OFFICE -- OFFICE HOURS -- MAILING ADDRESS AND STREET ADDRESS. 
This office is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., except Saturday, Sunday, and legal holidays. The department's 
mailing address is: P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0041. The principal place of business is 700 S. Clearwater 
Lane, Boise, ID 83712. (4-7-11) 
006. PUBLIC RECORDS ACT CO;WPLIANCE. 
Any records associated with these rules are subject to the provisions of the Idaho Public Records Act Title 9, Chapter 
3, and Title 41, Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
007. -- 032. (RESERVED) 
033. RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
CASES. 
01. Authority and Definitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707, 72-735 and 72-803, 
Idaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval of attorney fees. (4-7-11) 
a. "Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. (4-7-11) 
b. "Approval by Commission" means the Commission has approved the attorney fees in conjunction 
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper 
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved. (4-7-11) 
c. "Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: (4-7-11) 
I. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; (4-7-11) 
ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the 
attorney seeks to be paid; (4-7-11) 
iii. 
client; 
It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the 
(4-7-11) 
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iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incuned in the case through which the 
fund was raised; and (4-7-11) 
lien. 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging 
( 4-7-11) 
d. "Fee agreement" means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and 
counsel, in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (IRPC). (4-7-11) 
e. "Reasonable" means that an attorney's fees are consistent with the fee agreement and are to be 
satisfied from available funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained in JRPC 1.5. (4-7-11) 
i. In a case in which no hearing on the merits has been held, twenty-five percent (25%) of available 
funds shall be presumed reasonable; or (4-7-11) 
ii. In a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (JRP), Rules X and XI, thirty percent (30%) of available funds shall be presumed reasonable; 
or (4-7-11) 
HI. In any case in which compensation is paid for total permanent disability, fifteen percent (15%) of 
such disability compensation after ten (10) years from date such total permanent disability payments commenced. 
(4-7-11) 
02. Statement of Charging Lien. ( 4-7-11) 
a. All requests for approval of fees shall be deemed requests for approval of a charging lien. (4-7-11) 
b. An attorney representing a claimant in a Workers' Compensation matter shall in any proposed lump 
sum settlement, or upon request of the Commission, file with the Commission, and serve the claimant with a copy of 
the fee agreement, and an affidavit or memorandum containing: (4-7-11) 
I. 
ll. 
The date upon which the attorney became involved in the matter; 
Any issues which were undisputed at the time the attorney became involved; 
(4-7-11) 
(4-7-11) 
111. The total dollar value of all compensation paid or admitted as owed by employer immediately prior 




Disputed issues that arose subsequent to the date the attorney was hired; 
Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes available funds; 




vii. Counsel's itemization of medical bills for which claim was made in the underlying action, but 
which remain unpaid by employer/surety at the time of lump sum settlement, along with counsel's explanation of the 
treatment to be given such bills/claims following approval of the lump sum settlement. (4-7-11) 
VB!. The statement of the attorney identifying with reasonable detail his or her fulfillment of each 
element of the charging lien. (4-7 -11) 
c. Upon receipt and a determination of compliance with this Rule by the Commission by reference to 
its staff, the Commission may issue an Order Approving Fees without a hearing. (4-7-11) 
03. Procedure if Fees Are Determined Not to Be Reasonable. (4-7-11) 
a. Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission will designate staff members to 
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determine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staff's informal 
detern1ination, which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable. Omission 
of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute grounds for an informal determination that the fee 
req uested is not reasonable. (4-7 -11) 
b. If counsel disagrees with the Commission staff's informal determination, counsel may file, within 
fourteen (14) days ofthe date ofthe determination, a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence and 
argument on the matter. Upon receipt of the Request for Hearing, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the 
matter. A Request for Hearing shall be treated as a motion under Rule IJI( e), JRP. (4-7-11) 
c. The Commission shall order an employer to release any available funds in excess of those subject 
to the requested charging lien and may order payment offees subject to the charging lien which have been detennined 
to be reasonable. (4-7-11) 
d. The proponent of a fee which is greater than the percentage of recovery stated in Subsections 
033.01.e.i., 033.01.e.ii., or 033.01.e.iii. shall have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence 
entitlement to the greater fee. The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness of his or her fee. (4-7 -11) 
04. Disclosure. Upon retention, the attorney shall provide to claimant a copy of a disclosure statement. 
No fee may be taken from a claimant by an attorney on a contingency fee basis unless the claimant acknowledges 
receipt of the disclosure by signing it. Upon request by the Commission, an attorney shall provide a copy of the 
signed disclosure statement to the Commission. The terms of the disclosure may be contained in the fee agreement, so 
long as it contains the text of the numbered paragraphs one (1) and two (2) of the disclosure. A copy of the agreement 
must be given to the client. The disclosure statement shall be in a format substantially similar to the following: 
Client's name printed or 
State of Idaho 
Industrial Commission 
Attorney's name and address _____ -:-_~---:___----------------
printed or typed 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
1. In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in which no hearing on the merits has been 
completed. In a case in which a hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 
thirty percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher 
or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a 
dispute regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition the Commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certifY that I have read and understand this disclosure statement. 
Client's Signature Date _________________________ _ 
Attorney's Signature 
(4-7-11) 
034. -- 060. (RESERVED) 
061. RULE GOVERNING NOTICE TO CLAIMANTS OF STATUS CHANGE PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 72-806, IDAHO CODE. 
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01. Notice of Change of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, a worker 
shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of status or condition. (4-7 -11) 
02. By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be given 
by: the surety if the employer has secured Workers' Compensation Insurance; or the employer if the employer is self-
insured; or the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance. (4-7-11) 
03. Form of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed 
within ten (10) days by regular United States Mail to the last known address of the worker, as shown in the records of 
the party required to give notice as set forth above. The Notice shall be given on IC Fom1 8, as prescribed by the 
Commission for this purpose, as substantially set forth below: 
Injured Worker 




NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUS 
SSN 
State Zip 
This is to notify you of the denial or change of status of your workers' compensation claim as indicated in the 
statement checked below. 
Your claim is denied. 
Reason 
Your benefit payments will be Reduced Increased 
Effective date 
Reason 
Your benefit payments will be stopped. Effective date 
Reason 
Your claim is being investigated. 
A decision should be made by 
Other Effective date 
Explanation 
See attached medical reports 
Signature of insurance company adjuster/examiner Date 
Name (typed or printed) 
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A sample copy of IC Form 8 is available from the; 
Industrial Commission 
700 S. Clearwater Lane 
P O. Box 83720, 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 




04. Medical Reports. As required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, if the change is based on a medical 
report, the party giving notice shall attach a copy of the report to the notice. (4-7-11) 
05. Copies of Notice. The party giving notice pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall send a 
copy of any such notice to the Industrial Commission, the employer, and the worker's attorney, if the worker is 
represented, at the same time notice is sent to the worker. (4-7-11) 
062. -- 999. (RESERVED) 
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